Author: Kaushik Kapisthalam
Publication: Asia Times
Date: December 10, 2004
URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FL10Df07.html
The United States is selling the
theory that the Pakistan-based nuclear proliferation ring has been broken
up and its mastermind, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, has been "brought to justice".
He is under house arrest in Pakistan. Unfortunately, as much as the Bush
administration would like to wish away the Khan issue, it continues to
dog two of the biggest foreign- policy crises for the US.
The first one is Iran. With the
re-election of President George W Bush, the neo- conservatives within the
administration want to ensure that the Bush second term looks at every
option, including a military one, to prevent Tehran from developing and
deploying nuclear weapons.
But then again, the neo-conservatives
do not want to talk directly to the hardline Iranian regime, and have let
Britain, France and Germany do the negotiations with Iran, in conjunction
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) doing the verification.
But so far, the Iranians have been playing a clever game of hide- and-seek
by agreeing to stop uranium enrichment one day, and denying it the next.
And IAEA inspectors, mindful of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction assessments,
have been cautious about giving conclusive findings on Iran's nuclear weapons
program. In this ambiguity, Iran could stall and dodge its way into presenting
the world a set of nukes as a fait accompli.
One man holds the key to this puzzle
- Khan. It now appears that Khan not only sold advanced uranium-enrichment
centrifuges to Iran; he likely sold it an actual nuclear weapon design
along with nuclear fuel material, according to a report issued by the US
Central Intelligence Agency on November 23.
A direct testimony from Khan, with
corroborating evidence obtained by IAEA inspectors, could provide the US
and the Europeans with clinching evidence of Iran's violation of its Non-Proliferation
Treaty pledge and lead to a showdown with the United Nations Security Council.
Faced with global condemnation, the Iranian clerics in this scenario may
choose to back down and agree to intrusive inspections.
But this could only happen only
if Pakistan allows IAEA inspectors to interrogate Khan. Official IAEA reports
on Iran reveal that agency's frustration at not being able to nail Iran
because of Pakistan's obstructive tactics. Interestingly, other IAEA reports
reveal that even the supposedly concluded investigation into Libya's nuclear
program hit a roadblock thanks to Pakistan's non- cooperation.
On the other side of Asia, the United
States' blow-hot, blow-cold crisis with North Korea appears as calm as
a dormant volcano, but is liable to erupt at any time without warning.
Prior to the US presidential elections in November, North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il had been stalling for time, hoping perhaps for a John Kerry
victory, which could have resulted in direct negotiations with the US.
But with a Bush victory, the Korean peninsula is once again headed toward
a possible showdown. Here too, the ambiguity about the North's nuclear
program has been a big hindrance for the US.
The bone of contention with North
Korea is its clandestine uranium- enrichment program, whose existence it
denies. The North contends, not too credibly, that it kept to its end of
the 1993 framework agreement and therefore deserves direct talks with the
US. In addition, the release of news of an earlier secret South Korean
nuclear-weapons program (since abandoned), gives the North a much-needed
lever. The North's main patron, China, has long demanded to see proof of
the uranium program, even though it should know about it for sure. No prizes
for guessing who holds the key to the secret door hiding Kim's uranium
program - it's A Q Khan again.
It has emerged that Khan was the
main figure behind what is now believed to be Pakistan's nukes for missiles
barter deal with North Korea in the late 1990s. Khan's eponymous lab in
Kahuta, Pakistan, has been producing the Ghauri medium-range ballistic
missile, which is in fact a repainted North Korean No-Dong missile. Part
of the payment for this illegal missile transfer is believed to be a complete
uranium-enrichment kit from Khan's nuclear bazaar. In addition, the only
nuclear device that Khan was entrusted to explode during Pakistan's 1998
nuclear tests is now believed to be a North Korean plutonium bomb, which
Pakistan tested as a returned favor for North Korean missile transfers.
Interestingly, former Pakistan army chief General Jehangir Karamat, whom
many experts claim oversaw this deal with North Korea, is now the Pakistani
ambassador in Washington.
The European Union has enough belief
in this claim to officially ask Pakistan about the test. Of course, for
the US to accept this would lead it to face the fact that at least the
North Korean side of Khan's business portfolio had state sanction in Pakistan
- a situation it desperately wants to avoid.
This brings us to how US policymakers
justified their decision to accept at face value Pakistan's "blame it all
on Khan" show put on by Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and
the accompanying televised confession by Khan. The official US stance was
best explained by Robert Oakley, a former ambassador to Pakistan, who told
the Associated Press soon after the Khan confession, "The most important
thing is to get as much information possible as to where the links [to
accomplices] were ... we have to make sure it doesn't happen again."
But George Perkovich of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, while supporting the free pass to Pakistan,
warned "there's always the possibility that you are being played by Pakistan:
that they will give you just enough information to keep the money flowing,
but not enough to root out the real problem".
Ten months since the confession,
Perkovich's caveat seems to be proving correct, as evidenced by the Iran,
Libya and North Korea investigations. Even efforts to nab other individuals
involved in Khan's dealings have been stymied. With Pakistan holding Khan
incommunicado, Malaysia, too, seems emboldened to hold the next person
in the Khan network, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, under wraps, fearful perhaps
of Tahir's ties to influential Malaysian politicians coming to light should
outside investigators get to interrogate him. Malaysian leaders clearly
operate on the reasoning that the US can hardly press Malaysia to make
a number two man available when they are mute spectators to Pakistan's
denial of access to the kingpin - Khan.
And then there is the possibility
that the Khan enterprise may not be the only underground nuclear network
around. Even as the Khan expose was unraveling in early 2004, American
investigators arrested a South African man named Asher Karni for illegally
trying to acquire and sell devices known as spark-gaps, which are used
in hospitals but which can also be used in nuclear warheads as part of
the triggering assembly. Karni was busted in a sting operation when he
procured and shipped 200 spark-gaps, which were disabled before Karni acquired
them. And the buyer was a state-owned "lithography" firm in Pakistan, which
is now known to have been a front for that country's Inter-Services Intelligence.
It can be concluded that Karni was supplying components for Pakistan's
nuclear bombs.
Further interrogation of Karni has
revealed a network spanning many continents, from South Africa to America
to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan. The Bush administration,
however, has been reluctant to divulge the details of the Karni investigations
for reasons that are evident. Karni was part of a loose network that supplied
dangerous material to Pakistani state-owned facilities. Khan led a network
that brought in material for the Pakistani government-owned facilities
and then turned around and sold excess material elsewhere. The only common
link between the Khan network and the Karni ring is the Pakistani government.
So if one were to focus on a particular person or entity with the aim to
ending nuclear proliferation, what would that be - Khan or the Pakistan
government? Gary Samore, former non-proliferation expert with the US National
Security Council, recently said that the Khan network was not an individual
matter but a manifestation of "proliferation as a matter of state policy"
by Pakistan.
One may wonder why Pakistan would
risk global opprobrium and keep the nuclear networks alive. An obvious
reason is that Pakistan needs the black market for the viability of its
nuclear-weapons program. Pakistani journalist Shahid ur-Rehman, who wrote
an insider chronicle of Pakistan's nuclear-bomb program, recently revealed
that Pakistan is still very dependent on underground networks for nuclear
weapons components.
The second reason could be that
Musharraf feels he is bulletproof when it comes to this issue because the
US is paralyzed by the general's oft-repeated claim that if he goes, all
(nuclear) hell could break out. In other words, the American brainstrust
has decided that pushing Musharraf on nuclear proliferation is a bridge
too far and will not even consider it. This gives Musharraf enough confidence
to do nothing more than to display some activity, without any underlying
action regarding the "investigation" of Khan's dealings.
This is not to say that the US should
take knee-jerk action, like taking military control of Pakistan's nuclear
assets, or do anything harsh to punish Pakistan. But the Americans can
and should ask Musharraf to justify the lavish rewards his nation has been
receiving from the US (aid, arms) and not be afraid to bring Musharraf's
bad- faith efforts out in the open. One must recall that even though the
US had been privately pressing Musharraf since 2001, he allowed Khan to
operate until 2004.
As former US Senate non-proliferation
expert Leonard Weiss put it to this correspondent, "Pakistan's lack of
cooperation on the investigations of the Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs
is more likely the result of not wanting more details of their illicit
nuclear trade to emerge." In the recent past, other prominent non- proliferation
experts, such as David Albright, Joseph Cirincione, David Kay, Kenneth
Pollack and many others, have publicly called for the US to press Musharraf
to give access to Khan.
For the US to keep hoping that Pakistan
will voluntarily reveal key nuclear network secrets, many of which likely
implicate key Pakistani figures and state institutions, is illogical and
dangerous.
Meanwhile, the nuclear underworld
is likely morphing rapidly and moving out of the reach of international
investigators. And Iran and North Korea are happily thumbing their noses
at America, thanks to America's impuissance with Pakistan.
Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance
journalist based in the United States.
