Author:
Publication: Mercury News
Date: June 26, 2005
URL: http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/11990139.htm
The first published interview with
new CIA Director Porter Goss, which appeared this past week in Time magazine,
contained a bombshell that exploded with barely any notice.
To the ritual question -- when will
we get Osama bin Laden? -- Goss gave a far from ritual answer.
``That is a question that goes far
deeper than you know,'' Goss began. ``We have some weak links'' that make
it impossible for now to get bin Laden, he explained, pointing to ``the
very difficult question of dealing with sanctuaries in sovereign states.''
Sounds like you know where he is,
the interviewer pressed. ``I have an excellent idea of where he is,'' Goss
responded.
The CIA boss was delivering a clear
message to the ``weak link'' -- Pakistan and its military ruler, Gen. Pervez
Musharraf.
As he did two weeks ago in Australia,
Musharraf claims to have Al-Qaida ``on the run'' in Pakistan, his forces
having chased them out of cities into the mountains and then ``occupied
their sanctuaries.''
That rhetoric draws derision inside
the CIA. According to sources familiar with the intelligence community
discussion on this issue, there is mounting evidence that the Pakistani
military -- and its intelligence wing, the ISI -- is nurturing its deep
ties to Islamist extremists, including those who are sheltering the Al-Qaida
leadership and leaders of the Afghan Taliban.
Recently retired CIA officer Gary
Schroen, who served for 20 years in that area, has just published a memoir
of the war on terror in Afghanistan. In an interview with Pakistan's Daily
Times, Schroen was even more explicit about bin Laden.
``He's hiding in Pakistan in the
northern tribal areas above Peshawar. . . . The U.S. government and the
U.S. military are not authorized by the Musharraf government to enter there
unilaterally,'' he said. Schroen speculated that some ISI officers know
exactly where bin Laden is hiding.
The White House and the State Department
know this but are keeping a debate over how to handle the ``Pakistan Problem''
behind closed doors. They argue that too much pressure could topple the
relatively moderate Musharraf and bring Islamist extremists to power in
a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
That dilemma is real. The administration
shoveled in economic and military aid while soft-pedaling Musharraf's miserable
record on democracy and human rights. But it is increasingly difficult
to cover up evidence that Musharraf is no longer delivering his side of
the bargain.
Consider just these few recent events:
* On June 5, the FBI arrested a
young Pakistani-American man and his father in Lodi. According to their
affidavits, the men purportedly lied about the son being trained during
the past two years in Al-Qaida-linked camps just outside Rawalpindi, home
to the army's headquarters. The Pakistani government hurriedly denied that
such camps existed.
* The following week, a Pakistani
TV network aired an interview with a senior Taliban commander in contact
with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and bin Laden. Afghan officials and the
outgoing U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, questioned how a TV
crew could find a man whom Pakistani intelligence services say they can't
locate.
* On June 20, Afghan authorities
arrested three Pakistanis for plotting to assassinate the U.S. ambassador
to Pakistan, a frequent critic of Islamabad's failure to curb the Taliban.
Afghan officials see the hand of the ISI behind all this, including a recent
upsurge in Taliban violence.
CIA officers agree this is no rogue
operation. The only question is whether it was authorized by Musharraf,
and if so, why? There are no good answers to either question -- yet.
It is clear, however, that the ISI
continues to protect the Taliban, which it has done since the Islamist
group was created as an instrument of influence in Afghanistan. The Taliban,
in turn, enjoys the protection of fellow Pashtun tribal leaders whose realms
straddle the border. Bin Laden benefits from their sanctuary as well.
Behind this lies a deeper problem
of the long and intimate ties between the Pakistani military and Islamists,
a relationship explored in depth in an important new book, ``Pakistan:
Between Mosque and Military,'' by veteran Pakistani journalist Husain Haqqani.
``Militarism in Pakistan feeds Islamism
and Islamism feeds militarism,'' he told me, ``and the two can't live without
each other.''
That is the true ``weak link'' in
Pakistan. Until it is severed, the Pakistan Problem will only get worse.
Daniel Sneider is foreign-affairs
writer for the Mercury News. His column appears on Sunday. Contact him
at dsneider@mercurynews.com.
