Author: Ayaz Amir
Publication: The Asian Age
Date: July 23, 2005
How many crackdowns constitute a
crackdown? Every time the finger of suspicion or blame points at
Pakistan for some act of terrorism, General Musharraf orders a crackdown
on "extremist elements." The police respond by rounding up the usual
suspects.
Mosques and seminaries are raided,
maulvis and madrasa students are arrested and strong statements denouncing
religious extremism are issued. Taken in by this sound and fury,
many people are led to believe that the crackdown this time is for
real.
Soon the fever subsides and it is
back to business as usual, until the next alarm sounds and the government
of Pakistan again bends to the necessity of rounding up the usual
suspects. It has happened before; after the London bombings it has
happened again: same response, same statements, same grim looks,
and similar arrests. The difference this time is that given the embarrassment
of a Pakistani- origin connection to the London bombings, the authorities
here seem determined to round up double the number of the usual suspects.
In the order of battle devised for
Islamabad, it has become almost standard practice to raid the Lal
Masjid and the instructional seminary attached to it in Aabpara whenever
the authorities feel constrained to launch another campaign against
religious extremism. This is what happened some months ago, it has
happened again, male and female students being roughed up during
the latest police action.
Question is: If Lal Masjid and its
seminary are such a hotbed of extremism, why should it take the London
bombings for the authorities to move against them? Lal Masjid, mind
you, is in the heart of Islamabad, less than half a mile from that
holy of holies, ISI headquarters. Do such actions convince anyone?
True, responding to the absurdity
of the police raid on Lal Masjid, the authorities have belatedly
woken up. Heads have rolled, the entire police lineup in the capital
- inspector-general, superintendent, etc., being transferred. Far
from impressing anyone, this just goes to highlight the collective
sum of national efficiency.
If incompetence of this magnitude
can be allowed full scope in the capital itself, right under the
nose of the federal government, imagine the state of play, the state
of law and order, and the efficiency of the police in the rest of
the country. This after six years of Musharraf rule: not a very flattering
reflection on the present order. It bears remembering that Gen. Musharraf
declared war on religious extremism way back in January 2002, some
three and a half years ago. Hot on the heels of that declaration,
came another one in June the same year. Extremist organisations were
banned once, then twice.
Since then the Pakistan Army has
fought pitched battles against suspected extremist elements along
the Pakistan-Afghan border, suffering heavy casualties in the process.
The Americans have been allowed to install sophisticated surveillance
equipment at our major airports to keep a tab on outgoing and incoming
passengers. The jamming devices in the Mercedes cars used by our
high-ups have come as gifts from America. Gen. Musharraf has escaped
two attempts on his life, Shaukat Aziz one.
All this shows that if in the past
Pakistan was an exporter of religious extremism, it no longer is,
having learned the hard way the consequences of creating a (Frankenstein)
monster. There is nothing fake, therefore, about our conversion although
it must be admitted in the same breath that the quickness of our
conversion had a great deal to do with American persuasion. Left
to its own devices, the military establishment might have been tempted
to keep mouthing the old platitudes about holy war in Afghanistan
and Kashmir. For this small mercy at least we must be grateful.
But the point remains that if our
conversion is genuine, and there is nothing to suggest it is not,
why should Pakistan be put on the defensive when a Pakistani connection,
strong or remote, is uncovered in any terrorist act across the globe?
Why the need to play these games? If we are following a steady course
and there is no dichotomy in our thinking, then there should not
be any need for us to stage sound-and-light shows to impress outside
opinion.
A Pakistani connection to the London
bombings is sad but at the same time understandable. After all, under
military sponsorship and guidance, Pakistan took pride in being a
laboratory of jihad for well over 20 years, there being no madness
in Afghanistan in which we were not involved. With a legacy this
long it takes time for all its manifestations to be eliminated.
As for the Iraq angle to terrorism
today, thankfully we have nothing to do with it. Just as we earned
our terrorism spurs in Afghanistan, the United States and United
Kingdom are earning theirs in Iraq. Even as George Bush and Tony
Blair inveigh against terrorism, their misguided venture in Iraq
is doing more than Osama bin Laden ever could to strengthen it.
But it is for America and Britain
to clean up their mess. We have to clean up ours and in the litany
of national problems fanaticism gone berserk figures somewhere at
the top. But how do we lick it? Not by parading the usual suspects
when expediency so dictates but - and if this is not asking for too
much - by recasting national policy to ensure the retreat of militarism
and the primacy of democracy. If Musharraf and his generals are serious
about ridding Pakistan of religious extremism this is the choice
they have to make.
Indeed, this is the only real answer
to religious extremism. Remember, the madrasa phenomenon, far from
developing in a vacuum, or having a life of its own, was an outgrowth
of the military establishment's commitment to the politics of jihad.
Just as western money today has contributed to the phenomenal growth
of the NGO sector, back then Saudi and Iranian money, Sunni and Shia
Islam competing with each other and turning Pakistan into a battlefield,
went into madrasas. The only thing that can reverse this trend on an
enduring basis is democracy.
To recapitulate a tired argument,
of course our democrats are no angels and when in power they did
foolish and reprehensible things. But that is not the point. You
get the wrong sort of people in every democracy. American politicians
can do foolish things, ask Clinton. India had its Bofors scandal
and Narasimha Rao faced corruption charges. But you don't bring the
entire edifice of democracy down as a consequence as we, or rather
the military, tend to do in Pakistan.
Mistakes are made, even folly committed,
but elections are held, new governments are elected and life goes
on. If we are serious about getting out of the woods we have to learn
this lesson somehow.
If Pakistan instead has honed the
talent of sliding backwards, it is not because there is anything
wrong with its people, or because they are unfit for anything better,
but simply because the military won't allow other institutions to
develop. Look where this tendency has led us. Far from weakening
the mullahs, Musharraf inadvertently, or perhaps consciously, has
strengthened them.
He has played the mullahs against
the democratic parties and ensured that these parties remain weak
and divided. This has worked to the benefit of the mullahs. Never
much of a political power to reckon with, now, thanks to Musharraf,
they are. So what are we to make of his actions? Even as he preaches
"enlightened moderation," he presides over a dispensation which is
neither of these things. And he shows not the slightest sign of learning
anything from the history of Pakistan or indeed from the history
of the last six years.
We'll get more speeches about doing
the right thing, no doubt about that. But where's the action and
where the willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the larger good
of the country?
