Author: Editorial
Publication: The New York Times
Date: August 5, 2005
Afghanistan is out of the headlines,
but its war against the Taliban goes on. These days, it is not going well.
One of the most important reasons for that is the ambivalence of Pakistan,
the nation that originally helped create, nurture and train the Taliban.
Even now, Pakistan's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, seems to invest
far more energy in explaining his government's tolerance of Taliban activities
than he does in trying to shut them down.
General Musharraf has provided logistical
help to Pentagon operations and cooperation to American law enforcement
agencies trying to track down Al Qaeda leaders. But his aid has been frustratingly
selective. He has been an intermittent collaborator in the fight against
international terrorism rather than a fully committed ally. Washington
has been understandably reluctant to push him for more consistency, not
wanting to risk losing the help he does offer.
Pakistan's passive enabling of the
Taliban, however, is too important and dangerous for Washington to overlook.
The current Taliban offensive is killing American soldiers - at least 38
have died in action so far this year, as well as hundreds of Afghans. It
also endangers next month's parliamentary elections.
Successful elections are crucial
to extending the geographical reach of Afghanistan's new national institutions.
And they can provide needed political accountability for President Hamid
Karzai, who now rules without an elected Parliament. Afghanistan will be
a functioning democracy only when citizens can take their grievances against
the central government to elected local representatives instead of to armed
local warlords. Those grievances are real. Some governors and police chiefs
Mr. Karzai has appointed are thuggish and corrupt. Antidrug efforts go
after poor farmers while traffickers thrive. Alternative development lags.
A lack of judges stymies the rule of law.
Earlier this year, there were reasons
to be hopeful about Afghanistan's future. The presidential election had
gone off remarkably smoothly, and the absence of major attacks on polling
places suggested that Pakistan was at last responding to Washington's pleas
to rein in the Taliban. Mr. Karzai had begun easing notorious warlords
out of cabinet ministries and provincial governorships. More money was
being directed at antinarcotics efforts.
But once the snows began to melt
this March, Taliban fighters started showing up in greater numbers and
with suspiciously sophisticated gear in regions of Afghanistan that border
Pakistan. Afghan military and intelligence officers are convinced that
they are coming from Pakistani training camps.
General Musharraf says that he has
sent tens of thousands of troops to police border areas. Yet well-supplied
Taliban fighters keep showing up to battle American troops in Afghanistan.
He insists that the training camps are still shut down and that he is committed
to thwarting the Taliban, but says he must proceed cautiously so he doesn't
inflame militant groups in Pakistan. That would be more persuasive had
the general not spent close to six years marginalizing mainstream parties
and cutting deals with Islamic extremists to reinforce his rule.
When questioned about why he has
repeatedly violated his promises to restore civilian democracy, General
Musharraf argues that he must retain power because Pakistan needs his strong
and effective hand. Washington needs to ask him why that strong hand seems
so helpless against the Taliban.
