Author: Wilson John
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: August 31, 2005
The face of global terrorism is
changing so rapidly and dramatically that counter-terrorism experts and
security agencies are finding it almost impossible to keep track of the
growth and spread of terrorist networks. Today's jihadi is home-grown,
autonomous, computer-savvy and is willing to give up the comforts
of middle-class home to become a suicide bomber.
The Al Qaeda, which represents global
jihad, is witnessing a makeover today, transforming itself into myriads
of cells safely sheltered in unsuspecting societies, staffed by young men
who would otherwise find place
in sedate community newspapers
as benign volunteers.
The Al Qaeda, the fountainhead of
terrorism, has undergone several makeovers since September 11, 2001. The
beginning of the first phase could be traced to the First Iraq War
in 1991, just a little over a year after the Afghan jihad had come
to an end. Although the world remained oblivious to the coming together
of various terrorist elements under the leadership of renegade American
agent provocateur Osama bin Laden, the Al Qaeda carried out its first
major attack on the WTC on February 26, 1993.
The man behind the attack was Ramzi
Yousef, who later went on to become one of the key architects of the Al
Qaeda and the brain behind many of its operations, including 9/11.
The modus operandi of the attacks makes it clear that the Al Qaeda
had become an organised network of terrorists owing allegiance to bin Laden.
The operation was planned meticulously and several people were involved
in carrying it out. This was a telltale characteristic of the Al Qaeda
operations till recently. Another notable feature was the involvement of
terrorists of different nationalities in a single operation.
With the benefit of hindsight, it
can be safely assumed that the Al Qaeda was evolving rapidly after
the 1993 attack, creating terror cells from Karachi to Kuala Lumpur,
setting up financial networks that run parallel to official channels,
recruiting people from different walks of life but carefully choosing select
few - young, articulate and well-educated men from middle-class -
to carry out the final attacks.
The second phase saw a clear distinction
in the profile of the top leadership and the executives - those who executed
terrorist attacks from WTC to Bali. While the leadership remained
in the hands of former jihad leaders in Afghanistan like bin Laden, Al
Zawahiri and Khalid Mohammad Sheikh, the terrorist attacks were carried
out by neo-converts to jihad like Mohammad Atta. The Al Qaeda was
recruiting fast in Europe, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and even in the US.
The third phase of Al Qaeda emerged
and became public with the US bombing of Afghanistan immediately after
the September 11 attacks. With the fall of Kabul and Kandahar, the
Al Qaeda leadership and cadre took shelter in neighbouring Pakistan,
especially in south Waziristan and metropolitan cities like Karachi.
The rapidity with which the Al Qaeda changed was so dramatic that it took
less than a month for the group to merge with sectarian and terrorist groups
in Pakistan. This became clear with the brutal murder of Daniel Pearl in
Karachi in January 2002. The killing of Pearl - who was trying to unravel
the connection between the jihadis and the Pakistan establishment
- revealed, perhaps for the first time, that the Al Qaeda had successfully
merged with sectarian groups in Pakistan like Sipah-e-Saheba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
The experts call the first three
phases part of the evolution of Al Qaeda Version 01 - a homogeneous
group with a clear hierarchical order and a single target, the United
States. The US-led war on terror crippled Version 01 substantially.
Not only were its key leaders picked up or killed, the networks across
the globe were dismantled, the financial pipeline was choked and
the traditional supporting states were co-opted as partners in the
war on terrorism effectively neutralising, to a great extent, their role
in sustaining the terrorist network. Such systematic whittling down of
the global terrorist infrastructure reaped visible benefits for the US
and other members of the international community during 2003-05,
with terrorist threats across the world diminishing substantially. The
only exception was the Madrid blast which was a precursor to what
was to happen in London and Egypt in 2005.
Today the experts believe that the
Al Qaeda Version 02 has taken shape and is poised to create a new
wave of terror across the world, especially in the West. This Al
Qaeda is far different in ideology and profile from its earlier version.
What distinguishes the second avatar is its architecture. It is no
longer a homogeneous group, nor does a central leadership govern
it.
It has transformed itself into an
ideology and Osama bin Laden has become a demi-god, an icon, for the angry,
frustrated young Muslims in different countries. This transformation has
spawned countless clones of the Al Qaeda, acting more as independent
terror cells with its own leadership and operational methods, drawing
inspiration from bin Laden and his Al Qaeda ideology but working
independently in the selection of recruits and targets. The Madrid
and London bombing are clear pointers to this development.
According to Jerrold Post, a founding
director of the CIA's Centre for the Analysis of Personality and
Political Behaviour, from a loose-knit organisation, the Al Qaeda is mutating
into satellites that attract local operatives bound by disenchantment
with the Western societies they grew up in. He believes it was no
longer a hierarchy with Osama bin Laden calling the shots.
Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation
believes that with its founding fathers in hiding, and dozens of
key operatives under watch, the Al Qaeda was no longer capable of
large transnational attacks, and hence was taking advantage of people
who don't have to cross borders, receive cash from abroad or engage in
other international transactions that might alert authorities.
The dramatic change in recruitment
is an indicator of the alterations taking place in the terrorist
world. Instead of madarsa-indoctrinated semi-literates who flooded Afghan
terrorist training camps, the new groups are recruiting foot soldiers
from well-off immigrant communities in Europe, the US, and Australia,
etc. Diaspora is the new recruiting ground for Al Qaeda cells. "We are
seeing a terrorist threat that keeps changing," Pierre de Bousquet,
the head of France's domestic intelligence service, said in an interview
in Paris. Often the groups are not homogeneous, but a variety of
blends.
Another feature is the coalition
or partnership of crime and terrorism, which began in Pakistan in 2002.
Once the jihad in Afghanistan ended in 1989, it left scores of terrorist
camp recruits and teachers without a place to go. Many of them returned
to the madarsas and mosques to which they owed their allegiance.
Several of them later joined the newly emerging sectarian outfits like
the Sipah-e-Saheba while working, side by side, with criminal syndicates
in cities like Karachi. It was boom time for criminals in Pakistan
who thrived on these jihadis who were protected by both the state (ISI)
and religious organisations.
A more disturbing characteristic
of the new Al Qaeda is the extraordinary computer skills of its cadre.
According to one estimate, there are more than 4,000 websites advocating
attacks against non-Muslims worldwide. These websites not only preach hatred,
but also provide a variety of information on how to carry out terrorist
strikes. Analysts believe the Al Qaeda is the first guerrilla movement
in history to graduate from physical space to cyberspace. With laptops
and DVDs, in secret hideouts and at neighbourhood internet cafes,
young code-writing jihadis have sought to replicate the training,
communication, planning and preaching facilities they lost in Afghanistan
with countless new locations on the net.
The Al Qaeda's transformation is
not over. The terrorist cells that it has spawned in different parts
of the world will grow into autonomous groups with a collective global
ideology: Of war against Western societies and their allies.
