Author: Husain Haqqani
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: April 15, 2006
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story/2443.html
Introduction: India has put its cards on the
table but Pakistani officials, in the absence of realism, have been unable
to formulate a response
When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
spoke recently of a "treaty of peace, security and friendship" with
Pakistan, he inadvertently highlighted the different visions of India-Pakistan
relations prevailing in Delhi and Islamabad. India sees normalization as a
means of addressing disputes and issues that have proved intractable over
more than five decades. Pakistan, on the other hand, continues to insist that
normalization would be the end result, rather than the means, of resolving
disputes, especially the Kashmir question.
Manmohan Singh accorded priority to normalization
of relations between the two nuclear armed South Asian neighbors, hoping that
their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir would be resolved as a result of normalization.
Singh envisaged ''a situation where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can,
with the active encouragement of the Governments of India and Pakistan, work
out cooperative, consultative mechanisms.''
The Pakistani response, articulated by a glib
but not brilliant foreign office spokeswoman, was predictable. She said that
it would be ''unrealistic'' to expect Pakistan to move forward without progress
on the Kashmir issue. ''The ground reality from Pakistan's point of view'',
she explained, ''is that status quo meaning LOC was not acceptable to Pakistanis
or Kashmiris so a viable solution has to be found.''
Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri welcomed
the ''positive tone'' of Prime Minister Singh's statement. But he, too, emphasized
the need to resolve outstanding issues, including Kashmir, as a precondition
to normalization of relations.
This exchange, with India calling for normalization
and Pakistan insisting on ''resolving'' Kashmir first, miniaturizes the dilemma
of India-Pakistan negotiations. The international community, and sensible
people within both countries, wants the India-Pakistan dialogue to continue.
But once dialogue gets under way, it sooner or later ends with both sides
sticking to stated positions, with little scope for a substantive breakthrough.
Negotiations usually involve reconciling maximum
demands - what one side says it desires - with its minimal expectation, what
it will settle for. Most observers agree that India's maximum demand is that
Pakistan gives up its claim on all of Jammu and Kashmir, and its minimal expectation
would probably be that Pakistan accepts the status quo without further violence
and a de facto partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. An Indian negotiating
team would try to secure more than the minimum and would probably settle for
less than the maximum.
In recent public pronouncements, Indian officials
have made more or less official their preference for settling the Kashmir
issue on the basis of legitimizing the status quo, a de facto "take it
or leave it" offer albeit with minor sweeteners. But in Pakistan's case,
there has never been much discussion of a 'bottom line' national position
on the Kashmir conflict.
It is true that an overwhelming majority of
Pakistanis feel strongly that they were cheated at the time of partition,
when a contiguous Muslim majority state was not allowed to become part of
Pakistan. But now, given the price Pakistan has paid in military setbacks
and internal crises for trying to secure Kashmir, realism must dictate Pakistan's
foreign policy priorities.
Normalization of relations with India, an
emerging global power that is also the strategic partner of the world's sole
superpower, is far more important for Pakistan today than it was in the early
years of its life as an independent state. Pakistan no longer has the strategic
options of playing one cold war rival against the other to help compensate
for its military and economic disparity with India. Pakistan has tried, and
failed, to change the territorial status quo in Jammu and Kashmir through
both conventional and sub-conventional warfare. Efforts to secure international
support against India by emphasizing India's violations of human rights in
Jammu and Kashmir have also yielded little result.
The problem for Pakistan's ruling elite is
that after 58 years of describing Kashmir as Pakistan's primary national 'cause'
it is not easy, especially for an unelected military regime, to effectively
manage a major shift in national priorities. A feeling of insecurity against
a much larger and hostile neighbour was the original source of Pakistani apprehensions
about its nationhood. But over the years, structures of conflict have evolved,
with the Pakistani establishment the major beneficiary of maintaining hostility.
It is clearly in India's interest to help
Pakistan gain sufficient confidence as a nation to overcome the need for conflict
or regional rivalry for nation building. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's vision
of a comprehensive treaty of peace, friendship and security is a step in helping
bolster the confidence of Pakistanis in normal ties between India and Pakistan.
It is important for Pakistani civil society to acknowledge that normal relations
with India are the key to normalization of politics and policy in Pakistan
as well.
Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University's
Center for International Relations, and author of the book 'Pakistan between
Mosque and Military'. (Carnegie Endowment, 2005)
