Author: KPS Gill
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: June 24, 2006
In the aftermath of the Assam Assembly elections
where the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF), a coalition of Muslim parties
in the State that came into existence just months before the polls, captured
10 seats, there is now a focused effort, particularly among the more communal-minded
Muslim leaders, to extend this experiment to other parts of India. Most proximately,
this attempt to crystallise the 'Muslim vote' has found expression in the
creation of the Uttar Pradesh United Democratic Front, a Muslim communal formation
that seeks to replicate the Assam experience in UP in the elections of 2007.
There have, however, also been reports of efforts to raise new Muslim communal
formations in other States as well, and this has caused some concern among
intelligence and security agencies, but provoked a greater panic in 'secular'
political formations that have long taken the Muslim vote-bank for granted,
and who now fear they may lose their stranglehold on this block of votes.
As is almost invariably the case with contemporary
assessments by political parties in India, the conclusions being drawn are
short-sighted, hasty and tragically flawed. The error of assessment is the
most pronounced within Congress circles, since the direct impact has been
the greatest on the party and, had it not been for the chunk of Bodo votes
which offset the loss of what the AUDF gained, the regime at Guwahati would
have been far more tenuous than it currently is. To the extent, however, that
there is a risk that the same experience may be replicated in other States
as well, all political parties, including the Hindu right, are troubled. It
is significant that the BJP, after over a decade of struggling in Assam, still
managed just 10 seats in the election - barely enough to match the upstart
AUDF.
There is, of course, need to look into the
AUDF phenomenon - and its copycat potential - closely. The first questions
that arise relate to the extraordinarily abrupt emergence of this force, and
the need to assess whether this is essentially a local manifestation, or one
that links up with larger patterns in the wider neighbourhood. It is useful
to note that Badruddin Ajmal, the founding leader of the AUDF, does not come
from Assam's traditional Muslim leadership, but was a virtually unknown trader
before he practically stormed the State elections. How precisely does an obscure
businessman acquire a political profile of such prominence? Running a political
party requires enormous support. Who is standing behind the scenes to provide
this support? The Muslim clergy played a major role in the election campaign
in Assam this time around - what has provoked this sudden mobilisation?
It is, nevertheless, important to note that
the transient success of communal formations in India has historically not
been a consequence of factors integral to their own nature, profile or agenda,
but rather, arises essentially from the failures, miscalculations and rank
and habitual folly of secular formations. It is, in fact, the secular formations
that have historically been most guilty of creating and cultivating communal
and caste vote-banks - which are eventually taken over by more radical or
divisive parties and agendas. It is the Congress party's desperate efforts
to consolidate the Muslim vote-bank in Assam even, on at least some issues,
at the clear expense of the national interest, which prepared the 'Muslim
vote' for easy picking by the AUDF. Indeed, there has been a wider campaign
over the past year to exploit Muslim communal sentiments, as in the case of
the orchestrated protests on the Danish cartoon controversy and against the
Bush visit, as well as the manipulation of the Shia sentiment on Iran, in
which secular formations, including the both the Congress and the CPI-M, flirted
shamelessly with outright communal Muslim elements.
Other political miscalculations undermined
the Congress campaign in Assam as well, and at least some of these were connected
to the factional tussles within the party, as a result of which some of the
party's senior leaders, as well as some strong young secular leaders were
deliberately undermined.
Despite all this, however, it is significant that the AUDF is not riding any
overwhelming wave of Muslim support, but has benefited from high levels of
voter fragmentation. Indeed, the AUDF, according to some estimates, won no
more that 40 per cent of the Muslim vote - which is, of course, extraordinary
for such a young party - but the remaining 60 per cent remains substantially
with the secular formations, and principally with the Congress. It is useful
to note, moreover, that the Muslim vote is of decisive significance in nearly
50 per cent of Assembly constituencies, and a bulk of these have remained
outside the influence of the AUDF, though the nascent party contested as many
as 69 seats. The neglected lesson of the Assam elections is that the Congress
still represents the largest segment of virtually every community in the State,
including the various religious, caste and tribal demographics, and it does
so because it is still seen as principally secular and non-discriminatory
in its ideology - though possibly not, on frequent occasions, in its practices.
Secular democratic formations are increasing
tempted to flirt with the 'soft' communal card and the 'soft' caste card,
even as their governments fail to provide the basics of an acceptable standard
of administration and the non-discriminatory practices that are the soundest
guarantee of justice, and that all communities - including the minorities,
who may be briefly seduced by promises of privileged access to some benefits
- appreciate unfailingly at the hustings. All-India parties particularly cannot
rely on sectarian and divisive patterns of mobilisation if they are to survive,
and this is demonstrated, at once, by the continuous shrinking of the authority
of the Congress party, which is trying to compete with regional, sectarian
and caste based parties on their terms, as well as by the fate of communal
parties such as the BJP, which may do well in an occasional election, but
have been swept aside because they failed to meet popular expectations of
broad-based and effective governance.
Ultimately the only lasting 'card' that can be played is the 'development
card', the 'prosperity card', the 'efficiency card'. Political adventurism
based on disruptive sectional agendas may secure short-term gains, but these
quickly vanish, as does the party's legitimacy and long-term capacities for
political mobilisation, if the basics of administration, of non-partisan access
to developmental services and public goods, the imperatives of law and order
and of justice, are neglected.
