Author: Husain Haqqani
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: July 24, 2006
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story/9172.html
Introduction: The Musharraf regime risks responsibility
for the actions of the non-state actors it has given free rein. West Asia
is a good example
Over the last few days, terrorists have severely
disrupted - fatally undermined, some argue - the peace processes in South
Asia and the Middle East. Unlike Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories,
widespread violence has not yet erupted between India and Pakistan. But given
the two countries' history, their war of words should not be allowed to escalate
unattended.
It is unrealistic to expect sustained dialogue
between India and Pakistan until Pakistan puts Islamist militants, the Jihadis,
truly out of business and India begins to address the insecurities of Pakistan's
elite about Pakistan's long-term strategic situation. For the last several
years the Jihadis have simply been put on hold, told by Pakistani officials
to suspend operations without actually being decommissioned. As India postponed
the next round of India-Pakistan talks in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist
attacks, Pakistan gave no indication that it was willing to move in the direction
of shutting down Jihadi groups based in the country.
Pakistan's official response to India's allegations
about the complicity of Pakistan-based groups in the Mumbai attacks has been
technical, not politically substantive. The Foreign Office spokeswoman argued
that India had not conveyed "anything in writing or talked of any evidence."
But that is hardly the point of contention at this moment. Pakistan's argument
would have been much stronger if Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) did not operate freely
at all within Pakistan despite having been officially banned five years ago.
It may well be true that India has not yet
found conclusive evidence of LeT's involvement in the Mumbai attacks and that
the attacks might have been the handiwork of a homegrown Indian terrorist
group. But the fact that LeT operates in Pakistan as Jamat-ud-Dawa, and even
received acknowledgement from General Pervez Musharraf for aid work in the
aftermath of last year's earthquake in northern Pakistan and Kashmir, is hardly
conducive to an India-Pakistan peace process.
No amount of denials from Pakistani officials,
or even LeT itself, of non-involvement in the latest attacks inside India
washes away the group's history. Its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed declared
in 1999 that, "Our Mujahideen will create three Pakistans in India."
Then, in 2003, he told a Pakistani reporter that he considered suicide bombing
the "best form of Jihad." Hafiz Saeed also rejected the very notion
of a peace process between India and Pakistan.
Such rhetoric cannot be disavowed by rhetoric
about the need for proof of a specific group's responsibility for specific
attacks against India. By allowing Hafiz Saeed, his group and others like
them the freedom to organize and operate in Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf's
government has undermined its own credibility in the peace process. Just as
Lebanon is paying the price of tolerating and co-opting Hezbollah without
securing a commitment of renunciation of terrorism from the group, Pakistan
risks responsibility for the actions of non-state actors it gives free rein.
General Pervez Musharraf secured international
legitimacy in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in
the United States by becoming an American ally in the global war against terrorism.
But there is a clear reluctance about moving against anti-India groups. That
these groups share an ideology and worldview with Al-Qaeda does not seem to
alter the Musharraf regime's perception of these groups.
In his speech, released through Al-Jazeera
in April, Osama bin Laden spoke of a ''Crusader-Zionist-Hindu war against
Muslims''. Bin Laden's decision to add Hindus to his traditional harangues
against Zionists and Crusaders indicates that the al-Qaeda chief understands
the value of aligning his views with those of Pakistani Jihadi groups.
The Jihadis have only brought violence, instability
and defamation for Pakistan. Now their presence has caused the breakdown in
South Asia's peace process, which is crucial for the region's stability and
prosperity. Why then are Musharraf and the Pakistani establishment reluctant
to root out the Jihadis with the vigor that Pakistan's military governments
have often shown in vanquishing their political enemies? The answer lies in
one of the major fallacies defining the Pakistani establishment's worldview:
the need to "internationalize" the Kashmir dispute.
During the recent controversy over whether
Musharraf, as army chief, had cleared the 1999 military operation in Kargil
with the then prime minister, Musharraf claimed that Kargil had helped "internationalize"
the Kashmir issue. Most thinking people the world over consider Kargil a misadventure
and a strategic blunder that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of all-out
war and cost Pakistan heavily in lives and international prestige. But for
Musharraf the cost was worth it because the conflict "internationalized"
the Kashmir dispute and that "internationalization" is somehow the
key to resolving the Kashmir problem in Pakistan's favor.
Just as Kargil was useful in "internationalizing"
the Kashmir dispute, the presence of Jihadis is seen by some Pakistani strategic
planners as an instrument of focusing international attention on an issue
that would otherwise be forgotten. But just as Kargil resulted in little substantive
gain for Pakistan, internationalization of the Kashmir dispute through the
statements or action of violent groups is also unlikely to be of any long-term
utility in an era of global consensus against terrorism.
(Husain Haqqani is Director of Boston University's
Center for International Relations and Co-Chair of the Hudson Institute's
Project on Islam and Democracy. He is the author of the book 'Pakistan Between
Mosque and Military')
haqqani@bu.edu
