Author: Wilson John
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: November 22, 2006
Disclosure made by NSA about the possibility
of LeT cadre infiltrating into the IAF is indicative of the terror outfit's
new strategy
India's counter-terrorism strategies are skewed,
thanks to policy-makers who refuse to look beyond the secured confines of
Raisina Hill. Those who hail the Havana agreement and the subsequent decision
to set up a joint terror mechanism with Pakistan suffer acutely from this
fatal myopia. They are either purblind or half-wits if they don't understand
that Pakistan has not only changed the rules of the game but the game itself.
Pakistan is today banking on the least articulated
and understood objective of a terrorist attack, the cycle of terror and hate,
to create, support and launch smaller groups of terrorists, mostly young and
new to the game, to carry out attacks, both physical and psychological, on
an expanding list of targets. These units draw moral and material support
from established and known groups like Al Badr, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) and
Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HuM) but operate with certain autonomy to create the necessary
distance, for Pakistan to gain the advantage of denial.
In Mumbai blasts, more than 300 persons were
picked up and interrogated for days before being freed. Many of them were
innocent and happened to be poor Muslims. Several among them in fact had rushed
to the blast site to help the injured. The mindless detention of such people
may not have created new jihadis, as some might like to believe, but the experience
has certainly left hundreds of young and middle-aged Muslims embittered. This
is what groups like LeT expect to happen, a cycle of hate and terror that
will fuel their jihad while keeping India trapped in a communal inferno of
its own making.
Another critical dimension to this challenge
is the naive interpretation of religious beliefs and perceptions in arriving
at conclusions, quite often misleading and therefore counter-productive. The
argument that Muslims, whether in India or elsewhere, are radicalised by reading
Quranic verses on jihad or hearing speeches on the theme is fallacious.
The radicalisation of the community, at least
some sections of it, needs to be studied in the context of political events
and processes, changes at social, economic and religious level. Analysing
religious beliefs in isolation is not enough to understand why some sections
of a community are prone to radicalisation, and revolt against the state in
the name of religion.
Radical Muslim groups like SIMI or LeT activists
like Jalees Ansari, Abdul Karim Tunda and Azzam Ghauri chose extremism in
response to the growing Hindu Right wing. It was a reactionary to address
a situation emerging from certain groups, often aided by the state, threatening
the identity of a community of religious believers. It was also instigated,
in large measure, by the state's failure to address these fears politically
and socially.
Today, groups like LeT are playing on these
fears and failures to extend their ideology of conflict. Although the group
found it extremely difficult to find recruits and support from J&K in
the initial days, in a short span of three years, it has established a network
of training camps and shelter houses across Kashmir that enabled one of its
operational commanders, Mohammed Muzammil to plan several pan-India terrorist
attacks, beginning with the September 2002 attack on the Akshardham Temple
in Gandhinagar. Since then, LeT's growth in Kashmir has been steadily growing.
This phase of consolidation, which witnessed
a closing of ranks among different terrorist groups in Kashmir and elsewhere
in India, is currently being replaced with a new strategy to integrate into
civil society. This is being carried out by religious decrees to observe purdah,
boycott Government functions and similar other directions to 'safeguard' Islamic
traditions.
The group has also been organising a variety
of civilian protests in the valley, including bandhs. There are also reports
of protests against the killing of militants in encounters, making it difficult
for the security forces to operate. Frequent protests against custodial deaths
have helped the LeT cause in striking a chord with the populace.
There are other equally important strands
to this strategy that merit attention. The group has been systematically trying
to infiltrate the political, bureaucratic and security establishment in J&K
with only occasional successes. To illustrate, a Srinagar lawyer and a political
activist Shabbir Ahmad Bukhari was caught providing fake National Conference
youth wing I-cards to three LeT terrorists. Likewise, Shakeel Ahmad Shafi,
a member of the State Youth Congress, facilitated LeT terrorists to smuggle
weapons and communication equipment through high security zones by providing
them with party I-cards.
The recent disclosure by National Security
Advisor MK Narayanan about the possibility of LeT attempting to infiltrate
into the Indian Air Force is indicative of this new strategy. This strategy
falls neatly into LeT's overall aim of liberating Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh
and affirming the validity of the two-nation theory and sow the seeds of another
Pakistan! The developments indicate Pakistan's new jihadi game in India.
(The writer is senior fellow, Observer Research
Foundation)
