Author: Saurabh Shukla
Publication: India Today
Date: July 16, 2007
Introduction: Recently declassified CIA documents
present an account of China's gameplan of intrigue and deception that led
to the 1962 Sino-India war
The Art of War was written by the Chinese
strategist Sun Tzu in 500 B.C., and is still considered a gospel for war and
strategic thinking in organisations around the globe, and if the recently
declassified CIA documents are to be believed, the Chinese mastered it perfectly
in the run up to the 1962 Sino-India war. The war remains one of the most
humiliating defeats for India that affected the Indian morale and damaged
India's efforts to present itself as an emerging power. It also pointed to
the lapses on the part of the Indian political and military leadership that
led to the war.
Delhi has maintained silence and has not reacted
and the Chinese have trashed the analysis, but the CIA papers present an American
insight into the difficult relationship between the two neighbours India and
China. Written soon after the 1962 crisis by a senior analyst, the report
uses both documents and discussions in the public domain as well as private
assessments to arrive at its conclusions. Its overall thrust, which is not
inimical to India's analysis of the debacle, is an exposition of how Chinese
Premier Chou en Lai tried to deceive the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, through a strategy of persuasion and coercion.
The question though remains as to why China,
despite Nehru's Hindi-Chini bhai bhai monologues, betrayed India, and went
to war with it in 1962? According to the CIA analysis it seems that China
considered India to be a long term threat and the Chinese leadership wanted
to deliver a major blow to India's political and military leadership, and
demonstrate its big power status. The paper quotes the Chinese President Liao
Shao Chi in his discussions with the Swedish ambassador in 1963 as saying:
"The attack had taught India a lesson and that for future Nehru and the
Indians must be taught that they can not change the border status quo by force."
Liao earlier told a Colombo conference that "China was a great power
and had to punish India once…China really can't accept India's attitude
that of a feeling of superiority to the Chinese."
More than that it was Nehru's personal prestige
as a leading Asian leader that played on the Chinese strategic thinking and
the paper argues that one of the Chinese leaders' priorities was to seriously
damage Nehru's prestige and credibility. Interestingly, the papers reveal
the Chinese mindset was aimed at humiliating the Indians. According to an
Indian foreign office note of 1959 quoted by the CIA: "The Vice Foreign
Minister indulged in personal attacks against Indian Prime Minister Nehru,
Defence Minister Krishna Menon and Secretary-General R.K. Nehru…Liao
charged the Prime Minister of India with dishonest dealing." In fact,
when the Secretary General to the Ministry of External Affairs (mea) R.K.
Nehru went to Beijing, he was badly humiliated by the Chinese. The papers
say: "The mea Secretary-General, R.K. Nehru was scolded like a small
boy by Lio Shao-Chi in July 1961 for coming to China only to demand a Chinese
withdrawal."
While on one hand the Chinese played on Nehru,
they also used the Indian communists to discredit him. As the papers reveal:
"Chinese diplomats were tasked to play up through the Indian communists
that Nehru was pro US. He is Kennedy's lawyer, a Chinese diplomat told a senior
Indian communist." The papers also disclose that Nehru wanted to have
a deal on Aksai Chin, in exchange of the Indian ownership of Arunachal Pradesh,
which, interestingly, continues to be a bone of contention. "For a while
in fall (autumn) 1959 Nehru seemed to be preparing the Indian public for cession
of the Aksai Plain (Aksai Chin) to the Chinese in exchange for Indian ownership
of the nefa (now Arunachal Pradesh), but this view was opposed by some leaders
in the Congress party."
The papers also provide some insights into the Tibetan issue, which has often
been seen as a leveraging point for India vis-a-vis China. However even though
Nehru provided political asylum to Dalai Lama and his supporters, despite
Chinese protests in 1959, they also indicate this uneasiness with hosting
the Dalai Lama. Did Nehru want to shun the Tibetan cause, and ask the Dalai
Lama to leave; the report says that he had privately said so. "For Nehru,
who on the one hand was compelled by the presence of Dalai Lama on Indian
soil to defend him and on the other hand was reluctant to further strain Sino-Indian
relations, he told the Tibetan leader to limit his activities in India to
religious affairs, and Indian officials were probably reflecting Nehru's real
anxiety when they stated privately that the government would not be sorry
to see the Dalai leave the country," the report claims.
India's military miscalculations are also
much in evidence. The CIA papers reveal that the Indians were caught on the
wrong foot and had completely miscalculated their strength vis-a-vis the Chinese.
After the failure of talks, Indians had adopted a forward policy of establishing
as many frontier posts along the disputed border resulting in many clashes
with the Chinese army. During this period, General B.M. Kaul, the then chief
of general staff, told the US ambassador John Galbraith "that the Chinese
were not operating from strength; the Indian Army viewed the Chinese as set
in a 'mood' for weakness and the Indian policy was to take maximum advantage
of this mood by establishing maximum posts …Indian army is not in a mood
to be pushed around."
But the military assessment proved to be inaccurate
and according to the CIA's account of the Indian Cabinet meeting held on August
1, 1962 the then defence minister V.K. Krishna Menon said, "Indian military
position in Ladakh were untenable, Indian forward posts would be wiped out
and the Chinese could, if they desired, push the Indians far beyond their
1960 claim."
The papers also comment on the role of the
Soviet Union, which was a strong friend of India and its leader Nikita Khrushchev.
Even though the then Soviet Union did not cast its lot with China despite
the Chinese attempts to get Moscow on board citing the Communist card, Indian
establishment was unimpressed by the Russian role. "Indian Foreign Secretary
S. Dutt told an US official that Khrushchev was no help with the Chinese at
all."
The CIA papers are surprisingly blank on the
US approach and role it played during this crucial period. Despite the obvious
drawbacks, some analysts believe that the papers do have a relevance in the
contemporary perspective. "The Sino-India war of 1962 and the Chinese
betrayal of Nehru points to one thing that the Chinese can go to any length
for territorial gains from their neighbours; they did that then in 1962, and
even now they claim Arunachal Pradesh as their own territory despite an agreement
that settled populations will not be disturbed," says former Indian foreign
secretary, S.K. Singh, who is now the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh.
"These papers provide yet another reminder
of why we can't trust the Chinese. They can go back on their word. On the
border issue, we need to be careful while negotiating with them," cautions
strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney. However, others like Vinod Khanna, a former
Indian ambassador and director, Institute of Chinese Studies, says: "There
is nothing that is startlingly new in these papers. India and China are two
mature powers and are not going to be rattled by CIA writings of 40 years
ago." Thereby hangs a tale.
