Author: G Parthasarathy
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: November 29, 2007
When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991,
the United States emerged as the world's sole superpower. The US remains the
pre-eminent global power, but is increasingly conscious of the limitations
of its military power. It realises that it has to act in concert with other
influential powers to achieve common goals.
How does India figure in emerging global power equations? Few analysts would
disagree with some of the findings of the US National Intelligence Council
(NIC) in its report about emerging global power equations till 2020, "Mapping
the Global Future". The principal finding in the NIC report is that even
in 2020, the US will remain the most powerful nation in the world economically,
militarily and technologically. The US's pre-eminence, however, will not be
undisputed and its position cannot be sustained if it loses its present technological
edge. Studies by some of our economic experts tally with this assessment.
The NIC report recognises that the emergence
of India and China, as well as other new global players, will transform the
geopolitical landscape in this century, with impacts similar to the rise of
a united Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century.
Given rapid rates of economic growth in Asia, the balance of economic power
will inevitably shift from Europe to Asia, which will become the world's manufacturing
hub. The main challenges that countries in Asia will face to sustain their
growth rates will arise from instability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region,
which could jeopardise security of energy supplies and from terrorism and
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The report notes that facilitated by global
communications, radical Islamist ideology will spur terrorism globally in
coming years. The US will, however, hopefully recognise that the use of coercion
and force to effect "regime change" for achieving regional and non-proliferation
objectives in an already volatile situation in the Persian Gulf would be profoundly
destabilising. We are, thus, going to see greater trends towards multi-polarity
in the global order, though the US will remain the pre-eminent global power.
How will the US and China view other players
in coming years? While the Bush Administration has followed a dual policy
of engagement and containment in dealing with both Russia and China, will
such a policy continue under a new Democratic Party dispensation? Senator
Hillary Clinton -- currently a front-runner in the US presidential election
of 2008 -- recently stated: "Our relationship with China will be the
most important relationship in the world in this century."
While acknowledging differences with China
on issues like human rights, religious freedoms and Tibet, Senator Clinton
noted: "There is much that the US and China can and must accomplish together".
She, however, warned the Russians against "regional interference",
evidently alluding to the ongoing rivalry between the US and Russia over the
oil and gas resources of the Central Asian and Caspian regions and in former
Soviet Republics, neighbouring Russia.
Most American academics believe that with
its declining population, outdated technologies and poor standards of governance,
Russia's role in world affairs, unlike that of China, can be marginalised.
This could be a serous miscalculation, as it shows poor understanding of Russian
resilience and ingenuity, in the face of adversity. American experts, however,
expect that the current phase of Russian-Chinese bonhomie will end as differences
grow on issues like the movement of Chinese into the under-populated Siberian
region and over access to the energy and natural resources of Central Asia.
The expectation is that after benefiting from transfers of weapons and missile
technologies from the Russians, the Chinese will gradually dump the Russians
as Mao did in the 1960s -- culminating in the Mao-Nixon honeymoon in 1972.
Should a Democratic Party Administration assume
office in Washington in 2009, India will find the US making common cause with
China, as it did in the 1990s, to compel India to sign the CTBT and "cap"
its nuclear weapons programme by ending production of fissile materials for
nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, the US will have an interest in
engaging an economically resurgent India. As Senator Clinton noted: "In
Asia, India has a special significance, both as an emerging power and the
world's most populous democracy... We must find additional ways for Australia,
India, Japan and the US to cooperate on issues of mutual concern."
Given the predominant role that many Clinton
aides envisage for China -- the role of a "benign hegemon" in East
Asia, according to some -- India will have to seek closer relations with China's
neighbours like Russia, Japan and Vietnam, if a healthy balance of power in
Asia is to be ensured.
Given the "compulsions of coalition politics",
New Delhi has downplayed the significance of recent Chinese efforts to contain
India. While China continues to assist Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile
programmes and seeks to surround India with naval facilities in Sittwe, Hambantota,
Gwadar and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, it makes no secret of its distaste
for our "Look East" policies, of seeking closer ties with ASEAN.
Commenting on India's recent foreign policy initiatives, the influential Renmin
Ribao noted in August 2007: "The US-India nuclear agreement has strong
symbolic significance (for India) achieving its dream of a powerful nation...
In recent years, it (India) implemented a 'Look East' policy and joined most
regional organisations in the East Asia region." Thus, the Chinese find
India's legitimate efforts to break out from the shackles of global nuclear
sanctions, or to expand its role in East Asia, unpalatable.
China's recent bellicosity in laying claims
to Arunachal Pradesh and effectively repudiating the August 2005 Wen Jiabao-Manmohan
Singh Agreement, which stated that "in reaching a border settlement the
two sides shall safeguard populations in border areas", indicates that
China will use its border claims in that North-Eastern State as a tool to
compel India to go slow in developing relations with the US and the countries
of East and South-East Asia. China will also unabashedly use its apologists
and "political assets" in India to achieve this.
While the Chinese may pay lip service to their
love for a "multi-polar world", there should be no doubt that in
coming years, their primary aim is to emerge as the dominant power in Asia,
while fashioning a bipolar world order, with the acquiescence of the Americans.
