Hindu Vivek Kendra
A RESOURCE CENTER FOR THE PROMOTION OF HINDUTVA
   
 
 
«« Back
Indian Maoists: Changing tactics

Indian Maoists: Changing tactics

Author: Saumitra Mohan
Publication: Deccan Herald
Date: November 8, 2007
URL: http://www.deccanherald.com/Content/Nov82007/editpage2007110734648.asp

Maoists are exploring newer ways to intensify the people's war by increasing their mass base across the country.

The recent surge in naxal violence including the attack in Jharkhand resulting in the killing of 18 persons has established beyond doubt that naxalism is more than a mere law and order problem. And now that increasing evidence is being found of their extra-national linkages with the forces hostile to the interests of this country, there is definitely a need for a renewed thrust for tackling this hot potato.

Army intelligence is reported to have proved a close connection between the Maoists and the terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The arrest and subsequent interrogation of the Nepalese Maoist, Pasang Lama, on Indian territory has only substantiated this link.

Hence, an emergent need has been felt to develop a more synergised strategy to tackle this menace. In fact, both central and state governments have been at the drawing table for quite some time to develop such an action plan. The recent Bhubaneswar meeting of National Naxalite Co-ordination Committee was one such step in this direction.

Naxalites are believed to be working at a counter strategy including exploring newer ways to intensify the people's war by increasing their mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is the principal force on the naxal scene, accounting for almost 98 per cent of ultra left-wing extremism in India.

If we try to see through the pattern, breadth and precision of naxal violence in the country, then we would find that the naxalites have not only been successful in strengthening the People's Liberation Army, the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, but have also succeeded in recruiting more cadres through militant, but populist mass movements against the neo-liberal policies of globalisation, liberalisation, and privatisation.

Their strategies seem to expand the armed struggle from "guerrilla war" to "urban and mobile warfare", focusing on industrial areas.

With Singur and Nandigram coming into focus, naxalites seem to be placing more reliance on agrarian revolution and protracted people's war as the path for their so-called "new democratic revolution", as seen during the heydays of the Naxalbari upsurge in the late 60's and early 70's. The motivation for reversion to the nearly four-decades-old agenda is the temptation to capitalise on the controversy revolving around the conversion of farmlands into industrial zones.

The naxalites have, indeed, successfully cashed in on the popular resistance to the proposed land acquisitions in Singur and Nandigram, if reports of their expanding mass base in such areas are to be believed. They further plan to use resistance to the SEZ phenomenon as a means to extend their presence to new areas. Today, as many as 250 proposals to establish Special Economic Zones(SEZ) in 21 states are awaiting approval and naxalites are reportedly busy chalking out plans for more such flare-ups.

Taking a cue from their Nepalese counterparts, the "desi" naxalites are learnt to have got into collusion with the sundry revisionist and secessionist forces in a bid to expand their support base. Maoists in Nepal had declared their support to eight minority autonomous regions during their armed struggle phase and thereby got immense support, in turn, from these areas.

Naxalites, here, similarly have been supporting demands for separate states like Telengana and Vidarbha with an eye to the eventual setting up of a Maoist state in this country. Not only this, they also support the secessionist movements in north-east and Kashmir and as such they pose bigger threats to national security than we have cared to believe so far.

Maoists' new strategy seem to be setting up bases in new regions by means of taking up such emotive issues as forcible displacement caused by SEZs, industrialisation, infrastructure development projects, caste oppression and religious fascism.

Naxalites intend to turn the guerrilla war into mobile war and guerrilla zones into base areas. They have also been exploring newer tactics against the background of changes taking place in the agrarian situation including increasing resort to jail breaks and attacking the express centres of state power like police/military stations.

If we are to believe V K Duggal, Home Secretary, then the naxalite movement is well within control and the related violence has also declined significantly. Maybe he is right, the naxal violence may have declined, but it has declined only relatively, relative to 60's and 70's, but it has definitely been taking minatory proportions and, in fact, has been slowly spreading its tentacles to newer areas.

The Maoists do not abruptly launch into "armed struggle" or violence, but are known to proceed very methodically including conducting a preliminary study of local social, economic and political milieu and the vulnerabilities of particular populations before coming out with customised action plans. They prefer to maintain a low profile in adverse conditions. They deliberately keep violence low in border regions so as to keep away police attention, thereby facilitating intra-state movement.

Naxalites are known to follow flexible tactics. If the situation warrants, they restrict the movement at the level of political mobilisation, highlight local issues through front organisations and organise meetings in strongholds to garner popular sympathy.

Therefore, instead of focusing only on tackling the naxal violence, the government should monitor the activities of the front organisations as well. Moreover, there is a need to strengthen the capabilities of the local police in action and in intelligence collection. The same can be done through specialised training and provisioning of better infrastructure to increase their overall efficiency and effectiveness.

(The writer is an IAS officer presently working as an Additional District Magistrate, Hooghly in West Bengal.)


Back                          Top

«« Back
 
 
 
  Search Articles
 
  Special Annoucements