Author: M.D. Nalapat
Publication: Organiser
Date: December 2, 2007
URL: http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=212&page=35
Although the international media has highlighted
the opposition of the CPI and the CPM to the attempt by Manmohan Singh to
sign a nuclear agreement with the US that would contain the severe restrictions
imposed by the Hyde Act, the reality is that the two communist parties are
just a sideshow. And today, with Beijing too backing the Bush-Singh deal,
both the CPI and the CPM have visibly moderated their earlier opposition to
the proposed agreement, once again allowing the Sonia-led UPA to discuss the
deal in both houses of Parliament without a formal vote being taken. This
means that future generations will have no way of determining just which MPs
stood by the country's interest, and who for Sonia's. While the communist
parties oppose the deal because of the boost that its operationalisation would
give to technical cooperation with the US, Japan and the EU, nationalist elements
are against it because of the one-sided nature of the Hyde Act, that places
India in a supplicant position without any binding US assurances that the
bureaucrats in Washington will not do to this nuclear deal what they have
done to almost every other agreement reached with India on space, defence
and technology cooperation. Which is to unilaterally withdraw from its obligations,
because of changes in the domestic political weather, or the need to coddle
military dictators in Pakistan and others who seek the ruination of India.
Even as far back as 1963, the "non-aligned" Jawaharlal Nehru was
ready to become a US military ally, but was told to first surrender the residual
two-third of Kashmir to Pakistan. Today, what is being demanded is the downgrading
of India's nuclear deterrent in a context when rivals are improving theirs.
Angela Merkel of Germany was careless enough to admit that what was sought
by the NATO powers was the devaluation of India into a non-nuclear weapons
state, a demand that was met by silence by an indulgent Sonia Gandhi and her
Man Friday, Manmohan Singh
Should the Hyde Act be the template for the
proposed agreements between India and the NSG and the IAEA, the country would
pay a fatal price within decades. Around 2045, at most, known international
supplies of uranium are calculated to fall sharply, to very low levels by
2055 at the latest. By that time, thanks to the agreement sought to be entered
into by the Sonia team, the country would be saddled with several expensive
foreign reactors, all of which would need substantial quantities of imported
uranium, the price of which is rising even faster than that of oil. The cost
of the reactors and fuel would place such a financial burden on the exchequer
that it would not be possible to devote resources to the thorium programme,
which as a consequence would slow down from the present crawl to a helpless
stagger. With the death by slow strangulation of the three-stage thorium programme,
India's hopes for nuclear-based energy independence would disappear. That
successive governments in India have succumbed to outside pressure is clear
from (a) the half-hearted way in which uranium exploration and exploitation
has been carried out in India from 1992 onwards (b) the refusal of the authorities
to source uranium from the (uranium-rich) countries that are outside the NSG
and hence legally enabled to supply the mineral to India and (c) the refusal
to re-process the huge and in the present form hazardous nuclear wastes from
the Tarapur plant. There is no international or bilateral agreement whatsoever
that prevents the re-processing of this toxifying material, except cowardice.
With all their drawbacks, a reading of history makes it clear that both Rajiv
Gandhi and Indira Gandhi could have found the confidence to go ahead with
this essential measure. By refusing to permit re-processing of Tarapur fuel,
successive governments are exposing millions of citizens to a health hazard,
as well as denying them electricity through fuller use of the nuclear plants
already operational
That Sonia and her team are even more susceptible
to outside pressure than previous governments became clear with Manmohan Singh's
refusal to sign an agreement with Moscow for the supply of four new nuclear
reactors, because of the fear that this would-understandably-cause anger in
Washington and Paris, both of which are seeking to generate substantial profits
through nuclear trade with India. Even at this late stage, the country can
still be brought back from the brink of the disaster that the Hyde Act has
in store for it, if the Sonia-led government insists on a just deal from the
NSG and the IAEA. According to those aware of the needs of the Indian nuclear
industry, the minimum conditions that agreements with the IAEA and the NSG
have to meet are:
* The right for India to maintain a stockpile
of fuel to be used in contingencies related to disruption of supplies. Otherwise,
the country's development will be hostage of foreign capitals for the indefinite
future.
* The ratification by the IAEA and the NSG
of the Separation Plan in a way that ensures that all facilities designated
as military will not be subject to any inspection or outside control.
* In view of the fact that civilian reactors
are to be placed under international safeguards in perpetuity, these should
be given permanent assurances of fuel supply, whatever be the course of circumstances
in the military programme.
* All India-built reactors, including the
entire fast-breeder programme, should be outside the scope of international
inspections, so as to prevent the dissemination of original research to other
states.
Although it is a fact that some compromises
were considered during the time when the NDA was in office, especially during
the one-sided dialogues with the India-baiting Strobe Talbott, the fact remains
that the Vajpayee government was prepared to make far fewer concessions than
is the case with the Sonia brigade. Had the NDA been in office, for instance,
it is hard to imagine that fully 14 reactors would have been offered up for
international inspections and safeguards. The outer limit would probably have
been 10. And there is no way that the present moratorium on testing of a nuclear
weapon can continue, in case there comes up clear evidence that a rival has
significantly upgraded its capacity to rain death on Indian citizens through
a nuclear attack. Chaos and in other cases ambiguity in the dynamics of some
nearby nuclear states may make testing mandatory, and in such an eventuality,
the civilian reactors under international safeguards should not be forced
to shut down because of the withdrawal of supply of fuel. Should the IAEA
and the NSG follow the Hyde Act, India would destroy its strategic future
by agreeing to the cage prepared for it by an international community that
has sought to destroy India's nuclear industry for nearly four decades
That India and the US need to work together
is a given. Both countries need each other, and a just partnership would unlock
synergies that would be to the benefit of both peoples. However, this has
to be on the basis of equality of advantage and sacrifice. Now that the CPI
and the CPM have apparently decided to follow Beijing's lead in allowing the
Bush-Singh nuclear pact to proceed towards fulfillment, the only recourse
for nationalists is to make transparent the conditions under which they will
agree to continue a deal. Should the US and other NATO countries recognise
the centrality of India in their future security calculus, they would appreciate
that the conditions mentioned above are reasonable, agreeing to which by the
NSG and the IAEA can result in the nationalist community backing an India-US
nuclear deal that is just and realistic.
