Author: K. P. S. Gill
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: December 8, 2007
Despite West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb
Bhattacharjee's attempt to trivialise the Nandigram debacle as a mere "administrative
and political lapse", this issue is not simply going to disappear. The
recovery of the burnt remains of several bodies from shallow graves by the
roadside near Nandigram are a reminder to the nation of the gravity of the
excesses and incompetence that have marked the State's response to what should
have been a fairly manageable challenge for the district administration. Nandigram
is, in fact, symptomatic of a much wider collapse of administrative abilities
and competence, and it is useful to note that the capacities for governance
of the CPI(M), which has ruled West Bengal for three decades now, appear to
have abruptly disintegrated in the face of the very first challenge of significance
to confront the Left Front regime.
Stung by the crisis in Nandigram, compounded
by the violent demonstrations orchestrated principally by Islamist organisations
in the State (combining this issue with protests against Taslima Nasreen's
'blasphemies' against Islam), which forced the deployment of the Army in Kolkata,
the Marxist leadership has announced that it will raise a 'youth army' to
confront dissident groups in Nandigram and to re-establish its writ in the
State. Earlier, instead of relying on the State Police, and while actively
obstructing the Central forces deployed in the area to restore a modicum of
order, the Marxists had chosen to use armed party cadre to 'recapture' Nandigram,
engaging in extreme violence, murder and, if reports are to be believed, rape
as well.
The CPI(M) is not a unique case. Confronted
by the challenge of the Maoists in Chhattisgarh, the State Government sought
to piggy-back on some popular resentment against the extremists to engineer
the Salva Judum, arming ordinary tribals to directly confront the much better
organised, trained and armed Maoists. The principal instrumentalities of state
power, meanwhile, shirked their responsibilities to impose the law of the
land and to restore order and the security of private life and property in
widening areas dominated by Maoist extremists.
These are, of course, the more visible and
large-scale examples of the degree to which India's thin veneer of democracy
is actually underpinned by unashamed political thuggeries that use every means
possible to seize and hold power. That, precisely, is why so many criminals
and Mafiosi are able to secure party tickets in every Parliamentary and Assembly
election -- not to mention the lesser electoral processes of local bodies
-- and why so many of the most unsavoury characters sit in India's highest
elected chambers.
And that is why all the present bunkum about
'police reforms' will lead nowhere. State Governments have, in fact, by and
large and over the decades, actively undermined police organisations and the
All India Services, including the Indian Police Service. The Supreme Court's
orders on police reforms have, in fact, been used by many of the States to
draft legislation that is even more antediluvian and regressive than the much-abused
(but almost never implemented) 'colonial' Indian Police Act of 1861. The reality
is, India's political parties -- without exception -- have demonstrated no
faith in, or commitment to, the rule of law, and have actively and persistently
employed criminal force to distort electoral processes and outcomes, and are
now increasingly relying on this source of 'power' to 'resolve' various administrative
challenges confronting the state machinery. Instead of telling the District
Collectors and the Superintendents of Police to implement the law and maintain
order in their jurisdictions, political parties in power feel it more expedient
to call on the local thug to stamp out any 'troubles' the administration is
experiencing -- and particularly any political opposition that may come into
play.
If this process continues -- as indeed, it
must be expected to, in the utter absence of any willingness on the part of
even a single political formation to challenge or reverse it -- it cannot
be long before private armies become the norm across much of the country.
These already dominate vast areas of the poorly governed parts of India --
and that is a very large part of the country. With organised efforts by mainstream
parties to use 'informal' and party organs to engage in violent mobilisation,
and the public advocacy of extra-legal measures by high elected officials
such as West Bengal's Chief Minister and other senior CPI(M) apparatchiks,
these proclivities will become further entrenched and make inroads into urban
centres and State capitals as well. In many areas, people are already reluctant
to take their complaints and grievances to the police, preferring to rely
on kangaroo courts run by political thuggeries, Mafiosi and 'revolutionary'
groups such as the Maoists. There is, everywhere, evidence of a rising anarchy,
and an erosion of administrative capacities to a point where Government has
become irrelevant to the lives of a large proportion of the population, or
where the agencies of Government are visible only as an obstruction, a burden,
or as active oppressors.
The reality is that there is an enveloping
lack of even the most basic administrative competence in the political executive
in India today. Politicians are, of course, masters of manipulation and deceit
-- and these are the 'skills' that catapult them into positions of great power.
But these are also the perversions that have done incalculable harm to the
nation, and much of this harm has been focused on the poorest and most vulnerable
segments of the population.
The political executive can extract, from
its administrative instrumentalities, as much as its own competence and vision
allows. In Assam, in Punjab, and in Gujarat, under the worst of circumstances,
but in periods where a clear political mandate was available, I was able to
extract a hundred per cent and more from the State police forces. But in other
areas and at other times, the same forces have appeared infirm, corrupt and
incompetent. Certainly, in my personal experience in Chhattisgarh, the State
police performed at a small fraction of its potential, and the blame must
lie squarely where the Constitution of India vests the greatest power and
responsibility -- the State's political executive and elected leadership.
The 'administrative and political lapses' that Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee
would like to dismiss as an aberration in Nandigram are, in fact, a chronic
malady of the political executive in almost all States today -- though this
may be noticed only from time to time, when things go out of hand in atrocities,
excesses, public disorder and mass violence.
