Author: Claude Arpi
Publication: Rediff.com
Date: March 26, 2008
URL: http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/26claude.htm
Since the unrest started in Tibet, I am often
asked: "What is the solution for Tibet?" Invariably, I answer: "I
don't know". I am aware that there have never been so many 'experts'
and 'knowledgeable commentators' who have ready-made solutions, but having
spent 37 years trying to understand the intricacies of the Tibet issue, "I
don't know" is the only honest response.
Of course, one can think of different scenarios
such as the "fall of the Berlin wall" or the "collapse of the
former Soviet Union". I still remember the Dalai Lama 'prophesying' at
the end of the eighties (before the Tiananmen events), that China may go through
a similar fate as the Soviet Union within five years. When several years later,
I asked him about his 'prophesy', he just laughed and said that it was a 'big
mistake'. He added that it was not a 'spiritual' prophesy, but just logical
thinking. It is true that things could have gone differently had the Elders
not sent tanks to crush thousand of students on the Square.
Another remark of the Dalai Lama comes to
my mind. It was in 1986, during an interview, he told me: "We Tibetans
can't do anything, except to keep their culture alive. A change will come
from within China; it is our only hope".
Twenty two years later, I believe that this
statement is the closest to a possible future scenario or 'solution'. In this
context, it was heartening to read the statement of 29 Chinese intellectuals:
'We hold that we must eliminate animosity and bring about national reconciliation,
not continue to increase divisions between nationalities. A country that wishes
to avoid the partition of its territory must first avoid divisions among its
nationalities. Therefore, we appeal to the leaders of our country to hold
direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama.'
Though one can only applaud the courage of
the academics and artists, there is a more important aspect to consider: the
debate at the top echelon of the Party. Presuming that the Chinese Communist
Party is here to stay for some more time, the key word for a possible solution
is 'nationalities'. Although one has the impression that the CCP is a monolithic
organisation with a strict hierarchy and no discussion is allowed, it is far
from true. One example is a series of three letters written a couple of years
back by a Tibetan Communist veteran to President Hu Jinatao on the issue of
nationalities which could have far-reaching consequences for Tibet.
Bapa Phuntso Wangyal is not an ordinary Tibetan.
He was the first Tibetan Communist in the forties and in September 1951, he
led the Chinese troops into Lhasa. In his recent letters, Wangyal, known as
Phunwang by the Tibetans, accused some of the hardliners (alias 'leftists')
within the Party of being insincere: 'They make a living, are promoted and
become rich by opposing splittism,' he wrote to Hu.
Though the 'leftists' are bound to prevail
till the Olympic Games, many watchers believe that Phunwang's theoretical
position on nationalities may trigger a debate within the Party hierarchy
on 'the correct handling of the situation in Tibet' and a possible return
of the Dalai Lama.
In one of his letters written in 2006, Phunwang
pointed his finger at the retired General Yin Fatang, a former party boss
in Tibet, for sticking to 'wrong' leftist policies still implemented today
in Tibet. He told the Chinese President that the Dalai Lama had said he wants
greater autonomy, not independence: 'But Chinese and Tibetan leftists, or
conservatives, are convinced otherwise and regularly denounce him for trying
to split Tibet from the Chinese motherland.'
Historically and interestingly, Communist
leaders have not always responded with the same brutality that we see today.
Some officials had a more sensitive approach. One of these leaders is Hu Yaobang.
In May 1980, the politburo decided to send a high-level fact-finding delegation
to the 'Tibet Autonomous Region'. The delegation was headed by Hu Yaobang,
then General Secretary of the CCP. Reaching Lhasa, Hu Yaobang was shocked
to see the level of poverty in Tibet. During a meeting with the Party cadres,
he asked 'whether all the money Beijing had poured into Tibet over the previous
years had been thrown into the Yarlung Tsangpo [Brahmaputra] river'. He said
the situation reminded him of colonialism. Hundreds of Chinese Han cadres
were transferred back to China.
Unfortunately this more intelligent policy
did not last long. In 1988, Hu Jintao (today President) took over as Tibet
Party Chief. On March 5, when some demonstrations erupted, the People's Armed
Police 'took control of the situation'. A Chinese journalist Tang Daxian witnessed
the events. He later wrote in The Observer that on March 6 alone, 387 Tibetans
were massacred around the Central Cathedral in Lhasa. Twenty years ago, there
were no mobile phones and video cameras to witness the carnage. The hardliners
had won.
Phunwang told also Hu that Beijing was mistaken
to believe that the Tibetan issue would be solved with the death of the present
Dalai Lama: 'Any notion of delaying the problem until after the 14th Dalai
Lama dies a natural death is not only naive, it is also unwise and especially
tactically wrong.'
He reminded the Chinese President about his
own objective to establish a harmonious society. If he strived for the return
of hundreds of thousands of exiled Tibetans, he could turn 'confrontation
into harmony'. Phunwang concluded:'wrong leftist policies continue on ethnic
and religious issues especially Tibetan issues? it should cease.'
Phunwang knows Tibet well. In May 1951, he
was instrumental in brokering the famous deal (known as the 17-Point Agreement)
between the 'local' government of Tibet and the 'central' government in Beijing.
At that time, he was close to the central leadership in Beijing, particularly
Mao. But he soon discovered that some Chinese officials suffered from the
same disease as the Nationalists: The Great Han Chauvinism. This disturbed
him a great deal.
When the Dalai Lama left for a six-month visit
to China in 1954, Mao ordered Phunwang to accompany the young monk everywhere.
During his long talks with the young Tibetan leader, he managed to convince
him that Communism was a good thing for Tibet. The Dalai Lama was touched
by his sincerity and love for Tibet.
Phunwang continued to work for his dream:
a modern and socialist Tibet, but in April 1958, he was unexpectedly arrested
and told that he needed to 'cleanse his thinking'. During the following 18
years, he was interrogated, tortured and kept in solitary confinement in the
most atrocious conditions. To not lose his mental balance he started to study.
As he was allowed Communist literature only, he took the opportunity to deepen
his knowledge of the Marxist theory and became the foremost expert on 'nationalities'
in the CCP.
According to him: 'In Marxism, the relationship
between nationalities in multiethnic states should be one of complete equality.
Marxism draws a basic distinction between nationalities embedded in class-based
societies and those in communist societies. In class-based societies, separatist
activities by minority nationalities are not considered negatively because
they are caused by the oppressive policies of the majority nationality and
the government it monopolizes.'
In a society where all the nationalities have
equal status, the State 'vigorously opposes the struggles of minority nationalities
against the State, labeling these pejoratively as 'splittist'. This is not
the case of Tibet where the majority nationality (the Chinese Han) is oppressing
the minority nationalities (the Tibetans). It is therefore 'correct and justified'
for the minority to struggle.
Phunwang adds: 'In the absence of true equality,
'splittism' is a valid response for minority nationalities in class-based
societies. It is, in fact, characteristic of class-based multiethnic nations.
By contrast, in socialist states, the majority nationality does not (or should
not) oppress the minority nationalities. All should be equal'. His conclusion
is 'Nationality unity, therefore, requires not suppression but new policies
that provide real equality [between nationalities].' In this context, true
autonomy is primordial.
The fact that this interpretation of Marxism
orthodoxy was sent to the Chinese President by a senior member of the Party,
means that the theoretical basis for the Chinese repression in Tibet is still
open to interpretation; though the tough guys are today prevailing, they have
not grasped the intricacies of the 'nationality' theory of Marx and Stalin.
Michael Sheridan, The Time Far East correspondent,
calls them the Faceless Trio. Sheridan wrote: 'The architects of Chinese repression
in Tibet are three senior bureaucrats little known to the outside world but
destined to be the focus of condemnation from human rights groups in the months
ahead.'
The infernal trio is led by Wang Lequan, Party
Chief in Xinjiang and member of the Politburo of the CCP. On March 10, in
a rare interview he said: 'No matter what nationality, no matter who it is,
wreckers, separatists and terrorists will be smashed by us. There's no doubt
about that.'
The second one, Zhang Qingli, Party Chief
in Tibet, who knows that Hu Jintao owes his phenomenal ascension in the Party
to his hard stand in Tibet at the end of the 80s. Zhang called the Dalai Lama
'a wolf in monk's clothes, a devil with a human face' and declared: 'Those
who do not love the motherland are not qualified to be human beings'.
According to Sheridan, the third toughie is
Li Dezhu, the party's racial theoretician. For him, China's objective is no
longer to preserve minority cultures such as the Tibetans, but to refashion
them.
All of them try to emulate their master, Hu
Jintao, who reached the top by smashing 'nationalities'.
The question remains, can a new Hu Yaobang
emerge after the Olympics? Can China find a Gorbachev who could take the Middle
Kingdom towards a more harmonious society? It may take several months before
we get an answer to these questions, but they are valid queries.