Author: Lieutenant General Ashok Joshi (retired)
Publication: Rediff.com
Date: September 8, 2008
URL: http://www. rediff.com /news/2008/sep/08guest.htm
On a cold and dark night somewhere high up
in Ladakh, a group of officers and jawans were huddled together in a tent
that was made livable by a stove. The mood was a mix of anxiety and humiliation.
The Chinese had dealt a few decisive blows and unilaterally withdrawn, leaving
India almost despondent. The prime minister downwards everyone was occupied
with thoughts about why this ignominy had come to us and what could be done
about it.
In this gloom, the conversation over rum was not about old times and old-timers,
as is normally the case when a former commanding officer is on a visit to
his unit. The senior war veteran present, a subedar -- he had seen it all,
from Alexandria in Egypt to Sangro in Italy, with the Eighth Army during World
War II -- asked of his old commanding officer: "Sahib, when we lost at
Panipat to Abdali, bad as it was, at least it was a tough fight in which everyone
was there, the prime-minister's brother and son downwards. The highest in
the land led in the battle from the front and all of them perished but they
did not quit. Even then the battle was lost. What would happen now if the
Chinese come at us again? Will any of the children or grandchildren of the
ministers join the armed forces and fight?" If such a question were to
be raised today, what would be the answer?
The question has already been answered unequivocally
by two generations since the early 1960s. With few exceptions, youth of capability
have turned away from the armed forces and opted for other vocations. Their
cost-benefit-analysis gave a clear indication to them that a career in the
armed forces was not for them. The armed forces, as a vocation has consistently
lost its sheen since 1947. At one time, the sons of two chiefs of the Indian
Army served in the armed forces; so did the scions of Baroda, Jaipur and Kapurthala
royal families. They did so with pride and without asking for any special
consideration. They looked upon the armed forces as a matter of pride and
honour and satisfied some of their own inner needs and longing to maintain
the tradition. In turn, they brought prestige to the armed forces.
Does it sound medieval? Actually, it is, but
so is the idea of fighting and dying in battle. Most of the present decision
makers in India, within the establishment, whether they are the elected politicians
in power, or the bureaucrats who are their key aides, or the members of the
judiciary, live in a world far removed from actual prosecution of war and
have no real feel or experience to get into the shoes of a professional soldier.
The armed forces expect much of individuals who serve in them, and their families.
On the other hand, maintaining the armed forces
demands a great deal of the nation in terms of the opportunity costs. No nation
in the world has such surfeit of resources that it can afford to incur opportunity
costs without qualms. The armed forces fully deliver only when they 'deter'
the adversary from battles because even victories are accompanied by irreversible
losses, particularly of life. The cost and consequences of lost battles and
wars, of course, are beyond recall. Some time in the future, the effectiveness
and the efficiency of the armed forces may prove to be one of the main determinants
of national survival with honour. There are national stakes in the effectiveness
of the armed forces.
It is for this reason that they make claims
on being a national institution. Constitutionally, don't they report to the
President of the Union? Apparently there appears to be inadequate comprehension
of the real issues involved in raising, equipping and governing the armed
forces. This is not uncommon in democracies, even amongst mature democracies.
The compulsions of electoral politics often prove overwhelming, apart from
the ideological baggage and prejudices. But the advanced democracies have
the monetary resources including the advanced technologies; and more importantly,
they have the tradition of their decision makers fighting in battles and wars
extending over several hundred years. Their knowledge of war and peace is
not academic. In India, there is an unfortunate belief that good arguments
will prevail. They may not. Even 'truth' does not always 'prevail'.
The armed forces, in their own way, are an
'anachronism' when it comes to their unique value-system in which loyalty,
courage, effectiveness, and continued defiance, even when there is no hope,
matter more than the values of 'civil society'. Bereft of this value-system,
and its concomitants -- an exaggerated sense of self-esteem that makes a person
think that he is irreplaceable, a belief that Lord God will back him, and
so on -- the armed forces may render themselves less than useful.
The decision and opinion makers too need to
help the professional soldiery so that it can protect its elan. Surely, elan
is not a commodity. But it cannot be the attribute of those who are made to
feel second class because they cannot maintain the lifestyle that their peers
do, or their children cannot go to the right schools. Money and prestige do
enter the calculus somewhere. To be told that the more intelligent have to
have far more because they passed the right competitive examinations does
not help much.
The military machine depends a great deal
on technology and its products but its most critical cogs are human which,
if substandard, can cause the system to collapse. Who mans this unique national
institution cannot be determined by market forces alone.
Elementary, is it not? Then how come, we in
India seem to be losing our focus over past 60 years? Look at the quality
of debate over the deal given to the armed forces by the Sixth Pay Commission?
The letter written by the three service chiefs to the defence minister towards
the end of August, asking that the decision by the government be put on hold
pending consideration of the recommendations made by them has caused some
sensation. At least one national daily took notice of the letter, and handed
down a rebuke to the service chiefs. How are the services concerned with equivalence?
Why have they shown the temerity even to compare themselves with the IAS?
What's the fuss about?
It seems that the chiefs of staffs were exercised
by one particular dispensation of the government on a matter that had been
referred by it to the committee of secretaries at the instance of the ministry
of defence. Precise details are of no general interest except that a deliberate
decision seems to have been taken by the government to disturb the equivalence
between the armed services, and the rest, to the detriment and disadvantage
of the former. The officers in the armed services feel either that they have
been brought down a peg or two in relation to their former peers, or the others
have been hoisted above them. The result is the same. The officers of the
armed services have been overtaken for reasons not known to them. Let us presume
that there are very good reasons for the government decision. But those reasons
are not known. Is it the public perception that the armed services must gracefully
accept what they are 'granted'? Come on, they have a code of conduct: 'theirs
not to question why'. What's the fuss about? They proudly wear the uniform.
Isn't that enough? Is that the message for the soldiery that public opinion
has, or is it the view of a small coterie?
But what is the rationale of decision making?
Of course, the rationale has been stated by the Pay Commission, you silly.
But what are the assumptions made? What has been the experience of those who
made the assumptions? Was there a single member in the Pay Commission who
had actual combat experience? Did the Pay Commission appoint a panel of consultants
who had the combat experience?
With the kind of non-violent struggle that
secured for India its independence, there were visions of India relying on
the police forces for maintaining the law and order, and making do with the
very minimum of the armed forces. No nation could do without them because
they were an essential trapping of an independent sovereign State. They would,
of course, mainly be employed by and for the United Nations to maintain peace.
Some of the idealism started evaporating as
early as October 1947 when troops had to be airlifted to Srinagar to stop
in their tracks the murderous tribes sent there by Pakistan. But for this
timely intervention, the Kashmir valley might have been an integral part of
Pakistan. The Chinese aggression from 1960 onwards brought about some reorientation
in thinking but there remained lurking doubts about them mainly on account
of happenings in Pakistan. Was it not important to ensure that the armed forces
did not damage the polity? They needed to be kept in their place. Therefore,
the basic outlook did not undergo a serious change.
The two fundamental tenets that guided the
decision makers in India seem to have been:
Every rupee saved by cutting down on 'unproductive' expenditure on armed forces
was for the national good.
The armed forces needed to be controlled and kept in their place by subordinating
them to 'civilian control'. This in effect has meant control by the civilian
bureaucracy because except when war is imminent, the actual decision makers
have little time for professional soldiery.
Even now the scope of the current debate is
narrow: it has been reduced to scoring of debating points by the advocates
of the armed forces, and their opponents. The debate is missing out on more
substantive issues. In any case, what has to be decided now cannot be postponed
indefinitely. Will the service chiefs be satisfied with just another consideration
by the government? The immediate problem has to be addressed: the hemorrhaging
of the armed forces by early exit of disenchanted or disappointed persons
has to be staunched. But that would nowhere be enough.
We in India need to move ahead at this stage,
and seriously question what has been taken for granted for last six decades.
But would that be enough to meet the national requirements? Or, do we require
a separate pay-commission for the armed forces? We may have to go further
than that. There may be a need for addressing the whole gamut of raising,
equipping, manning, and governing the armed forces so that their effectiveness
as a national institution is assured till, say 2040. The nation must know
who will bear arms for it, and why; the market forces are poor arbiters in
this matter, although gods as of now seem to have taken up their residence
in the market place.
Here is a rather sad quote from Rudyard Kipling's
Epitaphs of the War, 1914-18:
If any question why we died,
Tell them, because our fathers lied.
Will we deserve something better?
Lieutenant General Ashok Joshi (retired) is
a former Director General of Military Training, Indian Army.
