Author: B. Raman
Publication: South Asia Analysis Group
Date: November 1, 2008
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2909.html
The number of fatalities in the serial explosions
in Assam on the forenoon of October 30,2008, has since gone up to 75, with
the death of some of the injured in the hospitals. Another about 300 persons
are undergoing treatment in the hospitals and some of them are stated to be
in a serious condition.
2. According to the Police, there was a total
of nine blasts timed to take place in four different cities or towns in the
State between 11 and 11-30 AM.The most devastating in terms of casualties
(35 killed), property damage and psychological effect on the people were the
three in Guwahati, the Capital. In all these three cases, the improvised explosive
device (IED) was kept in the boot of cars. The use of the boot of a car for
keeping the explosives enabled the perpetrators to keep more explosive material
than one could in a bicycle or in a tiffin box. In the Ahmedabad blasts of
July,26,2008, the explosive device was kept in a car in the incident near
a local hospital. Motor-vehicle- borne IEDs also cause more casualties due
to the splinter effect and large fires, which have a traumatic effect on the
local population. Many who rang me up after the Guwahati explosions remarked
that the scene with cars burning reminded them of what they had been seeing
on the TV about similar incidents in Baghdad. This kind of trauma one did
not witness during the earlier serial explosions in three towns of Uttar Pradesh
in November last year, in Jaipur in May, 2008, in Bangalore and Ahmedabad
in July, in New Delhi in September and in Agartala in October. The three cars
had been kept parked with the IED near a vegetable and fruit market at Ganeshguri
below a fly-over, in front of the office of the Kamrup Deputy Commissioner,
and near a police station in the Fancy Bazaar. The Ganeshguri area is near
the high security complex of the capital.
3. There were three explosions in the town
of Kokrajhar in which 21 persons were killed. The IEDs were kept inside bags.
A bag left in a local fish market seemed to have caused the largest number
of casualties. Kokrajhar is the town headquarters of the Bodoland Territorial
Council (BTC). There were recently violent attacks on illegal immigrants from
Bangladesh by sections of the Bodo tribals. Eleven persons were killed in
two explosions in the Barpeta area. There was one explosion in the Bongaigon
area, which does not appear to have caused any fatality. According to one
report, the IED left in the Bongaigon area, which initially failed to explode,
exploded after the police found it and were trying to defuse it. Ten persons
were injured.
4. Forensic experts have not yet identified
the explosives used, but the local police have been suspecting that the perpetrators
had probably used a mix of the RDX and TNT. If they had used a high-power
explosive like RDX and kept it in the boot of a car, the number of instant
fatalities must have been more. Anyhow, one has to await the forensic report.
5. The traumatic nature of the explosions,
the like of which Assam-----particularly Guwahati---- had not seen before
caused an outburst of public anger against the authorities for failing to
prevent the explosions. This necessitated the imposition of a curfew in some
parts of the capital.
6. While Assam has been seeing for some years
well synchronised serial blasts----either in different places in the same
town or in different towns simultaneously--- those blasts were carried out
with low-intensity explosives with low lethality. The synchronisation, the
lethality and the expertise in assembling the IEDs exhibited in the October
30 blasts show the availability of higher lethality explosives and better
expertise in using them. It is the assessment of the local police officers
that the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the ethnic terrorist group
which has been fighting for an independent Assam, does not have the kind of
material and expertise used on October 30. Only jihadi organisations----of
local as well as Bangladeshi origin--- have such material and expertise. Among
such organisations are the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami of Bangladesh known as
HUJI (B) to distinguish it from the HUJI of Pakistan and the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen
(JUM), which had carried out nearly 450 synchronised explosions of low intensity
IEDs in different places in Bangladesh on August 17,2005. The JUM's activities
in Bangladesh are in a state of disarray following the arrest, trial and execution
of some of its principal leaders by the Bangladesh authorities last year.
While the Bangladesh authorities have been able to neutralise its top leadership,
its middle-level leadership, infrastructure and trained cadres are still intact.
Its capability for carrying out serial blasts of the nature seen on October
30 is unimpaired. The leadership, infrastructure and trained cadres of the
HUJI (B) are also intact.
7. The Assamese police authorities, therefore,
suspect that the explosions were more likely to have been carried out by one
of these organisations or both, with the role of the ULFA, if at all there
was any, limited to providing local logistics. The ULFA itself, through a
spokesman based in Assam, has strongly denied that it had organised the explosions.
The denial might have been motivated by the strong public anger over the blasts.
8.An organisation identifying itself by the
abbreviation ISF (IM) has claimed responsibility for the blasts in a text
message sent to a local TV channel in Guwahati. The authorities think that
these abbreviations stand for Islamic Security Force (Indian Mujahideen).
A local jihadi organisation by the name Islamic Security Force had come to
notice in 2002, but it had not indulged in such activities so far. The text
message might have been sent from a stolen mobile. Before the recent Olympics
in Beijing, there was an explosion in a bus in Kunming. The perpetrator of
that blast had also claimed responsibility in a text message sent from a cell
phone. He could not be traced by the local authorities.
9.Before the visit of L.K.Advani, the leader
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to Shillong on September 28 and 29, 2008,
the local police and media reportedly received two E-mail messages holding
out threats against him. One of these messages was from a local law student
by name Mominul Haque. He was identified as the suspected originator of this
message and arrested. The second message purported to be from what was described
as the North-East branch of the IM. It was reportedly received by a local
media house on September 25. The originator of the message gave his name as
Ali Hussain Badr, field commander of the IM in the North-East. The message
said: "Our main objective is to blow Advani to pieces. Our suicide bombers
are ready for this prestigious assignment. Advani's Hindutva demand seems
to push India into a fascist mould and, as is well known, the proclaimed and
identified main enemy of the architects of Hindutva (are) the Muslims and
the Christians. Apart from the Babri Masjid demolition to the Gujarat massacre
and the recent attacks on churches in Orissa, Karnataka, and some parts of
Madhya Pradesh, Advani has always tried to portray the Muslims and Christians
as inveterate enemies of the Hindus.This will be history in the making in
the state of Meghalaya when our suicide bombers will rock Shillong. Stop us
if you can. We have already set our foot in Shillong to kill Advani."
The Shillong Police took added precautions and no terrorist strike took place
during Advani's visit. The serial blasts in Agartala took place two days after
his visit to Shillong.
10 It is difficult to comment on the authenticity
of these messages sent in the name of the IM because the originators had not
given any indicator of authenticity. After the Jaipur and Ahmedabad blasts,
the originators had given such indicators in the form of pics of the IEDs
at the spot where they were left.
11. For the present, I am inclined to agree
with the assessment of the local police that there is a greater evidence of
jihadi involvement than ULFA involvement. The ULFA, being an ethnic terrorist
organisation, generally takes care to target mainly non-Assamese from other
parts of India such as Biharis and Sindhis working and living in Assam. It
avoids indiscriminate placing of the IEDS which might kill Assamese as well
as non-Assamese Indian nationals. The jihadis kill indiscriminately. The October
30 killings appear to have been indiscriminate
12. If one carefully analyses the various
serial blasts which have taken place in different parts of India since November,2007,
one could notice an organic, mushroom-like growth of jihadi terrorist cells
in different parts of India----- self-radicalised, self-motivated, self-organised
with self-planning and self-execution of the strikes---- with each cell motivated
by its own local grievances, but with all these cells having an as yet invisible
connectivity with a single brain and a single source of inspiration orchestrating
them. The police of Ahmedabad, Delhi and Mumbai have been able to identify
and arrest the individual perpetrators, but they still do not have an idea
of the brain and the command and control of these perpetrators.
13.The intelligence agencies and the police
have been repeatedly taken by surprise and there are many inadequacies in
their performance. But I find it cruel to keep criticising them all the time
because they can be effective only if the political leadership allows them
to be effective. Despite the wave of serial blasts and mass casualties caused
by the jihadis from our Muslim population, the present political leadership
in the Government of India and the Congress (I) continues to be in a denial
mode. For them, the Muslim votes in the forthcoming elections are more important
than the lives of innocent men, women and children. They are not prepared
to admit that some Muslim youth in our own Muslim population have taken to
jihadi terrorism of Al Qaeda kind. To admit that would amount to admitting
that their policy of mollycoddling the Muslims has proved counterproductive
and is threatening the unity of the country and its well-being. One can see
evidence of this disturbing mindset in the case of the Assam blasts of October
30 too. While the professionals have been saying that the jihadis have done
it, the political leadership is not mentally prepared to blame the Indian
jihadis.
14. In the face of the inaction by the Government
of India, the Indian Mujahideen is growing, like the Internet, organically-----
with nobody knowing where is the beginning of this Jihadi Net, where is its
end, how the various jihadi cells are connected with each other and who is
facilitating their connectivity. It is a frightening scenario.
15. The Annexure gives extracts from my earlier
articles on the subject.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
1.Despite the recent arrests by the police
of Gujarat, Delhi and Mumbai of elements associated with the IM and the SIMI
in connection with the serial blasts of the past, explosions continue to take
place in a widespread area across the country. This clearly indicates that
while the perpetrators of the previous blasts have been identified and in
some cases arrested, the jihadi iceberg and its command and control are yet
to be identified. The analytical reports regarding the IM and its linkages
being carried by the media on the basis of police and intelligence briefings
show that our police and intelligence agencies have been shifting from one
speculative assessment to another. ( 2-10-08 Mushrooming Terrorism: Now Agartala
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2866.html)
2.Pleasing the Muslims at any price----by
closing our eyes to the depredations of the jihadi terrorists in our midst---
in order to retain their support during the election has become an important
driving force of the electoral strategy of the ruling coalition. If hundreds
of innocent civilians have to die as a result, so be it. Keeping the Muslims
happy is more important than protecting the lives and property of the citizens
of this country. Another disturbing trend has not received the attention it
deserved. Many members of the Cabinet of Manmohan Singh and many leaders of
the ruling coalition are reportedly unhappy with the intelligence agencies
and the Police for speaking of home-grown jihadi terrorism. They are also
reportedly unhappy with the Prime Minister himself for drawing attention to
this in his address to the Governors' conference. They want that the focus
should continue to be on Pakistan and the terrorists sponsored by Pakistan
and that one should not highlight the role of the Indian Muslims in the global
jihad. They are worried that the talk of home-grown jihadi terrorism might
increase pressure on the Government to step up the monitoring of developments
in the Indian Muslim community and identify and neutralise the Indian Muslims
taking to jihadi terrorism. ( 20-9-08 JIHADIS HOLD INDIA TO RANSOM http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2850.html)
3.If these blasts continue in this manner
with the police and the intelligence agencies being perceived not only by
our public, but also by foreign Governments and investors as helpless, it
could come in the way of our efforts to invite more foreign investment. The
foreign investors have till now shown signs of continuing confidence in the
capability of our Police and security agencies to prevail over the terrorists
sooner than later. But, if such incidents continue at regular intervals, this
confidence could be shaken. (19-9-08 Counter-Terrorism: Act Now. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2848.html)
4.It should be apparent by now firstly, that
we have only identified the tip of the jihadi iceberg in our midst. The iceberg
itself remains unexposed. Secondly, we have not yet been able to identify
the command and control of the IM. Thirdly, like Al Qaeda, the IM is divided
into a number of autonomous cells each capable of operating independently
without being affected by the identification and neutralisation of the cells
involved in previous blasts. (13-9-08 Self-Styled Indian Mujahideen Strikes
in New Delhi http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2844.html)
