Author: Lieutenant General Ashok Joshi (retired)
Publication: Rediff.com
Date: November 27, 2008
URL: http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/nov/27-its-time-india-got-its-act-together.htm
News reports and visuals of the terrorist
assault on the commercial capital of India on November 26, 2008, make it abundantly
clear that detailed reconnaissance and even a few dry runs with local guides
must have preceded this coordinated attack.
The fact that one of the attacking teams ambushed
a vehicle of the Anti-Terrorist Squad itself shows the level of training and
preparedness of the attackers. The attackers seem to have taken hostages according
to their plan, and not at random. The singling out of the citizens of the
United States and Israel by the terrorists points in the direction of Al Qaeda.
Perhaps, the terrorists might have settled
upon the day and date of assault with prior and definite knowledge of some
event or the other in Mumbai. The sea-borne approach of the attackers possibly
points to the transportation of the main teams in ships up to release points,
and plans for their subsequent extraction.
The 'pathfinders' might have been inserted
earlier. This attack has all the signs of careful planning, preparation, and
execution comparable to what had happened in the US on 9/11. This does not
appear to be the handiwork of someone on a shoestring budget. This appears
to be a 'battle' in a carefully crafted campaign, or several campaigns.
The strategic objective of the converging
campaign(s) is the gradual weakening, and ultimate fractionalisation of India.
Pakistan could then emerge as the largest State in the subcontinent. Such
thoughts by Pakistani thinkers are on record. The scale and the audacity of
the attack is so shocking that it could not have been conceived, planned or
executed by the home-grown variety without active motivation, encouragement,
and assistance from determined centre(s) of power from outside of India.
The 'foreign hand' is no longer a mere 'shadow'.
The sight of the ongoing US-India strategic
partnership has unsettled Pakistan as few other developments since Kargil
have. The US had relied in the past on Pakistan to facilitate its access to
the Chinese leadership, as also to guard the US interests in the region by
thwarting Russian intentions. It seems that only the People's Republic of
China had thought things out and foreseen the advantage of helping Pakistan
with its atomic bomb way back in the 1990s, if not earlier.
China drove a wedge in the subcontinent by
enabling Pakistan with the bomb. Pakistan could now maintain its active hostility
to India in spite of India's vast superiority. At the other end of the spectrum,
it relied upon Pakistan to draw upon its fundamentalist elements to threaten
India with the spectre of civil war by deliberate acts of provocation. This
strategic plan has been in place for many years and Pakistan is unfolding
it.
The idea that Pakistan will cooperate with
India in 'fighting terror' is misplaced. The newly elected government in Pakistan
has neither the muscle nor the skill to restrain the fundamentalist elements
in Pakistan, assuming that it is sincere in its commitment to good relations
with India. Pakistan has been for so long under military rule that neither
the Pakistan bureaucracy nor the political class have any first hand experience
of exercising sovereign authority in its entirety. Pakistan's Inter Services
Intelligence can take on the role of 'non State actor' to achieve the Pakistani
national objectives, as indeed it has been doing in Afghanistan.
The Pakistan government under Musharraf has
been playing both ends against the middle since 9/11. On the one hand, it
gave assurances to the US that Pakistan was its partner in its war on terror,
and minimally cooperated with the US when cornered; on the other hand, Pakistan
manipulated the Taliban and other fundamentalists to continue with their activities,
particularly against India, in the name of its support to the 'freedom fighters'
in Kashmir.
The first strand of its policy ensured the
US support to the military government, and kept open the tap of US resources.
The second strand, kept up the level of hostility to India at the selected
benchmark but for which Pakistan fears that it would 'dissolve' in the subcontinent.
Any diversion of attention from Pakistan-generated
fundamentalism and its concomitant terror in all parts of India will hurt
the country. There are other radical groups in India; they have always been
there -- Communists in Telangana, Naxals, the militant Akali movement, and
so on. The Malegaon blast probe brings intimation of another radical group,
this time of Hindus. Some commentators have hinted that the radicalism of
the majority community -- a euphemism for Hindus, oh, how we love euphemisms
-- is by far the most dangerous.
As an academic conclusion, this is hard to
challenge, but as a practical proposition based on real life experience it
lacks substance. What has come out in the open from the Malegaon blast probe
is worrisome for the army, but it is a strong institution and will be able
to take care of itself.
Quantification and careful analysis of all
the past terrorist attacks is far more important than some arcane debate about
majority or minority radicalism. The 'statistical truth' culled from the past
attacks may be a better indicator of the probability of attacks in the future
than mental constructs about mere possibilities. This would help more in focusing
attention and directing effort in a productive manner. Political correctness
may have to take a second place.
Well-deserved praise of the majority of Indians
for their stoic tolerance is not out of place, but by itself, it is not sufficient.
The fact that life goes on as normal in much abused Delhi, Bangalore, Ahmedabad,
or Mumbai ought not to comfort decision makers. Even perplexed and benumbed
individuals follow what is normal to them because they do not know what else
to do. That much-quoted normal 'lesson' in a German school at the end of the
Great War, when Germany faced cataclysm, was an indication of helplessness
rather than phlegm or courage.
Helplessness implies willing acceptance of
victim-hood. Indians have lived for too long in this manner. A sense of personal
outrage and humiliation would be a better substitute because it would lead
to purposeful action. Citizens imbued with this feeling will demand action
of their leaders.
As of now, there is a sense of general insecurity
amongst citizens on the one hand, and the vigilantism is on the rise on the
other hand, which merely shows that some groups of the population feel that
they are getting a much worse deal than others, and take the law into their
own hand. Nothing increases desperation amongst sensitive and concerned citizens
more than the feeling that they are left to their own resources by the State.
That is how vigilantism takes its roots.
Poor governance and government officials who
are, corrupt, inefficient, indifferent, or cruel invigorate vigilantes who
are driven by their own sense of moral rectitude, no matter how misplaced
it may be. The countering of Pakistan-inspired terrorism has to be pursued
single-mindedly and not relegated and clubbed with the 'war on terrorism'
in general.
It is time to take heart that the Muslim clerics
in India have dispelled such doubts on this score as might have been there,
and declared that terrorism is not consistent with Islam. This should help
in setting aside ungrounded suspicions. War against Pakistan-inspired terrorism
is not a parochial undertaking; it represents a national consensus.
The indirect cost of the Malegaon-blast probe
-- still climbing -- is very considerable. None can gainsay at present what
national benefits would accrue from the Malegaon probe even when it is complete;
but the collateral damage so far has already been overwhelming. It is no one's
case that the Malegaon blast probe is either unimportant or unnecessary. It
appears, however, that the probe exclusively held the attention of the security
apparatus until November 26, 2008, when the disaster occurred. This could
well have been an unintended consequence, but it was terrible. The perspective
and the sense of proportion in evaluating threats, and assigning resources
for combating them, are so very vital. There is a need for a serious review.
The success in combating Pakistan-inspired
terrorism has not been significant, because a structured apparatus for the
purpose is not in place yet.
