Author: G. Parthasarathy
Publication: The Hindu
Date: February 19, 2009
URL: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/02/19/stories/2009021950400800.htm
If expedience led the Americans to allow A.
Q. Khan to go free two decades ago, have they realised the dangers they could
face by covering up the Pakistan army's role in facilitating nuclear proliferation
worldwide,
Why was the CIA so keen to let A. Q. Khan
off the hook? Was it part of an American policy to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's
nuclear weapons programme?
The decision of the Islamabad High Court to
release the 'Father' of Pakistan's "Islamic Bomb," Dr A. Q. Khan,
following a secret agreement between Khan and the Pakistan Government has
provoked widespread international concern. No one's buying the Pakistan Government's
stand that the A. Q. Khan affair is a "closed chapter". The court
decision constitutes direct and wanton defiance of American concerns about
the danger t hat Khan's release poses to international security.
Just after the court verdict, Khan defiantly
underlined his Islamist credentials by asserting: "I will always be proud
of what I did for Pakistan. I am obliged only to my Government, not any foreigners.
Are they happy with our Government? Are they happy with our Prophet? Never".
Khan's religious bigotry is shared by not only many in the Pakistani military
establishment, but also by his close associates involved in the Pakistan nuclear
weapons programme.
The Islamic dimensions of Pakistan's nuclear
ambitions were spelt out when then Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto noted that
while the "Christian, Jewish and Hindu" civilisations had nuclear
weapons capability it was the "Islamic Civilisation" alone that
did not possess nuclear weapons. He asserted that he would be remembered as
the man who had provided the "Islamic Civilisation" with "full
nuclear capability".
Islamic bomb
Bhutto's views on Pakistan's nuclear weapons
contributing to the capabilities of the "Islamic civilisation" were
shared by Khan's close associate for over three decades - fellow nuclear scientist
Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood, who, along with his colleague Chaudhri Abdul Majeed,
was detained shortly after the terror strikes of 9/11. They were both charged
with helping the Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear and biological weapons capabilities.
Mehmood openly voiced support for the Taliban
and publicly advocated the transfer of nuclear weapons to other Islamic nations.
Echoing Bhutto, Majeed described Pakistan's nuclear capability as the property
of the whole "Ummah" (Muslim Community). Mehmood and Majeed also
acknowledged that they had long discussions with Al Qaeda and Taliban officials.
A "factsheet" put out by the White
House stated that both scientists had meetings with Osama bin Laden and Mullah
Omar during repeated visits to Kandahar, with the Al Qaeda seeking their assistance
to make radiological dispersal devices. Documents recovered by coalition forces
in Afghanistan established that the two scientists were active members of
the Islamic organisation UTN, which was engaged in securing information on
biological weapons.
Two other Pakistan scientists, Suleiman Asad
and Al Mukhtar, wanted for questioning about suspected links with Osama bin
Laden, then "disappeared" near Myanmar's borders with China.
Assistance from N. Korea
Khan commenced his proliferation activities
in 1987, when with the approval of General Zia ul Haq, he offered assistance
to Iran. This process continued through the 1990s, with Khan supplying Iran
with "inverters" - equipment crucial for uranium enrichment in 1994,
through a Sri Lankan intermediary Abu Tahir Syed Bukhary.
Engulfed by economic bankruptcy, following
the termination of American assistance, Pakistan turned to North Korea, for
what led to a missiles-for-nuclear-technology deal.
This followed a Pakistan-China-North Korea
Agreement in January 1994, for cooperation in manufacture of missiles and
guidance systems. In 1995 a delegation led by Choe Kwang, Vice-Chairman of
North Korea's National Defence Commission, who was also in charge of his country's
nuclear weapons programme, visited nuclear establishments in Pakistan.
An agreement was reached on North Korea providing
Pakistan with fuel tanks, rocket engines and between 12 and 25 "Nodong"
missiles capable of hitting urban centres across India.
Between 1994 and 1998, Khan paid over a dozen
visits to North Korea. By 1998 aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force and the
Air Force-run Shaheen Airlines were carrying missile components and nuclear
enrichment equipment and materials between Rawalpindi and Pyongyang.
Tech for Iraq, Libya
There is evidence that around the same time,
Khan offered nuclear technology to Iraq and Libya. While Saddam Hussein was
guarded in responding to the Khan offer, Libya's Colonel Qadhaffi had no such
reservations and went full steam ahead with getting enrichment equipment and
even nuclear weapons designs (of Chinese origin) from Khan. Moreover, in 1998,
Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan was given unprecedented access to the
A.Q. Khan Laboratories in Pakistan. This was followed by exchanges of visits
between Khan and Saudi scientists to and from Saudi Arabia in 1998-1999. Saudi
Arabia's King Fahd, in fact, told senior American officials, at around the
same time that Saudi Arabia would need a nuclear deterrent if Iran developed
nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998 paradoxically
marked the beginning of Khan's decline, as the scientists and physicists led
by his rival Samar Mubarak Mand carried out the tests.
In the meantime, the CIA had infiltrated his
network in Dubai and Geneva and gained access to its computers and global
operations. Gen Musharraf was confronted with the evidence the CIA had collected.
Fearing that if he did not act against Khan, the Americans could well expose
the crucial role the Pakistan army had played in assisting Khan's activities,
Musharraf extracted a "confession" and "apology" from
Khan that he had acted illegally, out of considerations of personal profit.
But, like in their approach to Pakistani sponsored
terrorism, where they invariably give a clean chit to the ISI, the Americans
have absolved the Pakistan army, the ultimate villains in Khan's proliferation
activities, of all responsibility for what had transpired.
Khan was sentenced to four years imprisonment
by an Amsterdam Court in 1983 for illegally stealing nuclear weapons enrichment
technology and centrifuge designs from the Netherlands-based Physical Dynamics
Research Laboratory, where he worked between 1972 and 1976.
The sentence was later overturned on a legal
technicality. Former Netherlands Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers revealed that
his Government was all set to arrest Khan in 1975 and 1986 but was advised
against doing so by the CIA. Why was the CIA so keen then to let Khan off
the hook? Was it part of an American policy, especially in the 1980s, to turn
a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme?
Self-deception
If expedience led the Americans to permitting
Khan to go free two decades ago, with disastrous consequences, have they and
their friends realised the dangers they could well face in the future, by
deliberately covering up the role which the Pakistan army and successive Army
Chiefs have played in encouraging and indeed participating and facilitating
nuclear proliferation worldwide?
Have they also assessed the likely implications
of the "see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil" policies they
have adopted on the role of the Pakistan army and the ISI in promoting global
terrorism?
Diplomacy based on delusion and self-deception
inevitably has disastrous consequences.