Author: G. Parthasarathy
Publication: The Hindu
Date: June 11, 2009
URL: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/06/11/stories/2009061150250800.htm
Given the various challenges, with the country
virtually bankrupt, and the constant American pressure to act militarily on
its borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan's leadership will not be able to effect
any change in its usual hackneyed rhetoric on relations with India
The Americans seem to be overjoyed at what
they appear to believe will be an early end to Taliban control over large
tracts of Northwest Pakistan following the ongoing Pakistani military operations
in Swat. These military operations were literally forced on the army, as fears
grew that unless action was taken, the Taliban would spread their wings to
the very heart of the national capital. But, within two weeks of the commencement
of the military operations, the country fac es a new crisis, which threatens
its national solidarity and unity.
Speaking in Peshawar about the growing numbers
of people (described as "internally displaced persons" or IDPs)
who fled from their homes following the military operations, the Information
Minister of the Northwest Frontier Province, Mr Iftikhar Hussein, revealed
on May 29 that 2.8 million people had fled their homes from the scene of recent
operations. He added that this was apart from 600,000 other Pakhtuns (Pathans),
who had been forced out of their homes in earlier army operations, in the
Province's tribal areas.
As more and more IDPs pour into refugee camps,
Pakistan's resources are being strained. It has appealed to the UN and donor
countries for urgent financial aid. But more important than the economic implications
of the refugee influx, is the political fallout of the military operations.
It is now clear that fearing the spread of Talibanisation, major provinces
such as Sind and Punjab are refusing refuge and rehabilitation facilities
for Pakhtuns fleeing the impact of the army's operations.
Ethnic clashes
In the Sind province, Sindhi nationalist organisations
have joined the main Muhajir Political Party (MQM), which is now a coalition
partner in the Provincial Government, in warning that they will not accept
Pakhtuns who are IDPs. The MQM has warned that any influx of refugees into
Karachi could lead to ethnic violence. Even before these developments, ethnic
clashes between Muhajirs and Pakhtuns had rocked Karachi.
What has, however, surprised many Pakhtuns
is the attitude of the largest province of Pakistan, Punjab. According to
Mr Rahimullah Yufufzai, one of Pakistan's most respected journalists, even
the Punjab Government, headed by Mr Shahbaz Sharif, the brother of former
Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, has let it be known that it would
not provide facilities for camps for IDPs in the province and that it would
like camps to be set up within the NWFP for this purpose.
Legitimacy of Durand Line
Describing these developments, an anguished
Mr Yusufzai asks: "Is it asking too much from politicians who are in
and out of power and are supposed to show the way to the nation to be sensitive
to the pleas of IDPs instead of rubbing salt in their wounds? Or, according
to their interpretation, should the IDP issue be the concern of the NWFP and
the Pakhtuns only? If this is the case, then one should be worried about the
damage this attitude is causing to the concept of the nationhood of the Federation
of Pakistan".
Significantly, posters depicting the map of
separate "Pakhtunistan" have started appearing in the highways in
the Northwest Frontier Province. Given the Pakhtun aversion to recognising
the Durand Line as the International Border between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
can demands to have a relook at the entire question of the legitimacy of the
Durand Line become a renewed source of tension and a focal point of contention
between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
The military operations in Swat against the
Taliban commenced in mid-May. How is it that in barely two weeks, 2.8 million
citizens of Pakistan fled their homes? The fact is that whenever the Pakistan
army commences operations against its own people, it uses excessive force.
This was evident in Bangladesh in 1971, when Pakistan army brutality led to
eleven million people fleeing as refugees to India. In operations in Baluchistan,
in 1973-1974, and thereafter during the Musharraf dispensation, the army used
air power and artillery indiscriminately; it used air power to assassinate
the respected octogenarian Baluch leader, Nawaz Akbar Bugti. The Baluch used
to describe the former Pakistan army chief, Gen. Tikka Khan, as the "Butcher
of Baluchistan". Use of excessive force was also manifested in Pakistan
army operations in rural Sind in 1983 and, thereafter, between 1992 and 1996
against Muhajirs in Karachi.
Tolerating duplicity
What are the implications of more violence
of this nature against Pakhtuns of the NWFP? In the NWFP, the Pakistan army
is today operating against the kinsmen of those whose cause it had championed
in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and,
thereafter, in backing the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Worse still, the army and ISI have continued
to provide haven and support to the Afghan Taliban leadership led by Mullah
Omar in the capital of Baluchistan, Quetta, over the past seven years or more
and similar support to the Afghan Taliban military commanders like Jalaluddin
Haqqani in the tribal areas of the NWFP, while acting against Pakistani Pakhtuns,
who support their Afghan kith and kin. For how long can this contradiction
persist? Are the Pakhtuns so naive that they cannot see through such intrigues?
Finally, for how long will Pakhtun soldiers and officers, who constitute over
20 per cent of the Pakistan army, tolerate such duplicity? Moreover, are the
Americans so naive that they will not take note of such duplicity and turn
on the heat for action against the Afghan Taliban and their al Qaeda allies?
A Pakhtun phenomenon
There has naturally been concern about the
spread of Taliban influence eastwards towards India's borders. It has, however,
to be remembered that the Taliban are predominantly a Pakhtun phenomenon.
What is, however, now happening is that the influence of groups allied to
the Taliban, made up predominantly of Punjabi Pakistanis, is now spreading
across the Punjab Province of Pakistan? These organisations have cells in
virtually all towns and cities in the province. Recent attacks in Lahore on
the Sri Lankan cricket team, the Police Training facility and the ISI Headquarters
are evidently the work of those now described in Pakistan as the "Punjabi
Taliban" or the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Punjab. Conservative Wahhabi Muslim
practices are being increasingly advocated and even sought to be enforced
by these groups in Punjab Province. Can these challenges be overcome in Pakistan's
most populous Province bordering India, given the jihadi inclinations of the
army establishment and the ISI? The Lahore elite and India's "liberals"
seem oblivious to and in a dangerous denial mode, on these developments.
Given these challenges and with the country
virtually bankrupt and under constant American pressure to act militarily
on its borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan's leadership will not be able to
effect any change in its usual hackneyed rhetoric on relations with India.
This was obvious from recent comments by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr Yusuf
Raza Gilani, on Jammu and Kashmir. The more important question is, however,
whether given the army's failure to act quickly and decisively against the
Taliban, General Kiyani will seek to divert attention, by escalating terrorist
violence across Pakistan's eastern borders?
(The author is a former High Commissioner
to Pakistan. blfeedback@thehindu.co.in)
