Author: Claude Arpi
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: September 2, 2009
URL: http://www.dailypioneer.com/199746/A-non-offer-by-China.html
India had a full-fledged mission in Lhasa
till 1952. That's now a footnote of the history of Tibet's suppression and
India's failure to hold its ground. Strangely, India has been told that it
can open a consulate in the Tibetan capital. It makes little sense. Or does
it?
Jujian Hua, director at Tibet's Foreign Affairs
Office, recently made a startling declaration: "India can set up a consulate
in Lhasa". He then added, "That depends on India."
Mr Jujian Hua said, "The local Government
(of the Tibetan Autonomous Region) attaches great importance to trade, culture
and tradition, including tourism."
A day later, the Government of India clarified
that it had never approached the Chinese authorities for permission to open
a consulate in Lhasa. An Indian official said there was no question of discussing
this issue with China: "New Delhi has no plans to open a consulate in
the Tibetan capital."
In the not too-distant past, India had more
than a consulate in Lhasa; it had a full-fledged mission till the end of 1952.
India had inherited several rights and privileges in Tibet from the 1914 Simla
Tripartite Conference (between British India, Tibet and China).
Apart from the mission in Lhasa, there were
three trade marts managed by Indian agents posted in Gyantse, Gartok (western
Tibet) and Yatung (in Chumbi Valley near Sikkim border). These agents were
entitled to a military escort. The Post and Telegraph Service, a chain of
rest-houses and the principality of Minsar (near Mt Kailash) were also under
the Government of India's control. Over the years, all this would be 'offered'
to the Chinese, without any compensation or even trying to get a fair settlement
of the border issue.
Ideologically, the first Prime Minister of
India was not comfortable with what he called 'imperialist sequels'. He realised,
however, that these 'privileges' were useful for trade, as was the McMahon
Line, delineated in Simla, marking the border between NEFA and Tibet.
After the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950, the
Government of India found it increasingly difficult to retain these facilities
on the ground. Visitors, traders and officials from India began to be unnecessarily
harassed or put to hardship.
In the summer of 1951, KM Panikkar, India's
Ambassador to China, came to New Delhi for consultations; by that time he
was already in love with the Communist regime in Beijing. Jawaharlal Nehru
too was convinced that the future of India lay with the East: "For the
first time, China possesses a strong Central Government whose decrees run
even to Sinkiang and Tibet. Our own relations with China are definitively
friendly."
However, Nehru had to admit that there were
some differences of perceptions. The mission in Lhasa was one of them. On
November 3, 1951, when asked about this during a Press conference, Nehru remarked
that the Mission would continue to remain there.
A few months later, when questioned again
on the same subject, Nehru vaguely answered that the Mission was dealing "with
certain trade and cultural matters more or less". He added that technically
the mission never had any diplomatic status. This was not true since the British
and later the first Indian representatives had the status of a full-fledged
mission till the autumn of 1952.
During the same Press conference, Nehru declared
that he was not aware of "any infiltration of Chinese troops in India".
Rumours had begun about Chinese incursions through the UP-Tibet border (today
Uttarakhand) as well as through the Ladakh-Tibet border. The first Chinese
surveys for the Sinkiang-Tibet highway cutting through the Aksai Chin occurred
at that time (Nehru was informed by LS Jangpangi, the Indian trade agent in
Gartok).
In June 1952, Nehru had become prudent: "The
status of the representative in Lhasa has never been defined for the last
30 years." The Prime Minister pointed to the changed circumstances: From
an independent country, Tibet had become a country under China's effective
suzerainty. "China is now exercising its suzerainty".
Nehru explained that as Tibet was no longer
an independent country, the decision had been taken to demote the diplomatic
relations between Tibet and India: Indian Representative in Lhasa would soon
be re-designated as a Consul-General.
During the same month, the smart Zhou Enlai
told the gullible Ambassador of India that he "presumed that India had
no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties
of the past and was prepared to negotiate a new and permanent relationship
safeguarding legitimate interests".
Not only did the Chinese offer nothing to
India in exchange for its generosity, but New Delhi allowed China to open
a consulate in Mumbai. Unbelievable!
In a cable to Panikkar, Nehru said, "We
would naturally prefer a general and comprehensive settlement which includes
frontier." But he did nothing more.
A few months later, Panikkar, who had been
transferred to Egypt, wrote: "The main issue of our representation at
Lhasa was satisfactorily settled… there was no outstanding issue between
us and the Chinese". Again no reference was made to the border issue.
Hugh Edward Richardson, the last Head of the
British Mission in Lhasa, saw this development quite differently: "That
decision adroitly transformed the temporary mission at Lhasa into a regular
consular post. But it was a practical dimension of the fact that Tibet had
ceased to be independent and it left unresolved the fate of the special rights
acquired when Tibet had been in a position to make its own treaties with foreign
powers and enjoyed by the British and Indian Governments for half a century."
In April 1954, the 'born-in-sin' Panchsheel
Agreement was signed. Though the status of the Consulate- General and the
trade marts was confirmed, all the other privileges were surrendered. Over
the years, the situation became more and more untenable for the Indian officials.
After the Dalai Lama took refuge in India in 1959, Chinese authorities constantly
harassed the staff of the consulate and trade marts. When the Panchsheel Agreement
lapsed in April 1962, there was no point in renewing it. The trade marts were
closed and China asked the officials to vacate the premises. As the building
in Yatung belonged to the Government of India, the Chinese even asked India
to "take the building away". This became the subject of a long correspondence
between the two Governments.
On December 3, 1962, the Ministry of External
Affairs sent a stern note to its Chinese counterpart: "The Government
of India have decided to discontinue the Indian Consulates-General at Lhasa
and Shanghai from December 15, 1962 and to withdraw their personnel manning
these Consulates General. The Government of the People's Republic of China
is requested to take reciprocal action on the same date in regard to their
Consulates-General in Calcutta and Bombay."
Since then, there has been no Indian representation
in Tibet.
As for the probe sent by the Chinese to reopen
the consulate in Lhasa in a near future, one could ask: What is the point?
