Author: Amitabh Mattoo
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: September5, 2009
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/inside-the-terror-lab/513033/0
Introduction: A frightening account of how
big money, radical Islam and state patronage fuelled Al Queda's growth in
Pakistan's tribal areas
The British Empire had only one answer for
the problems of the tribal areas of the North West Frontier: leave them alone,
as much as possible. A political agent, with a minimalist agenda, relied on
the malik and occasionally the mullah to ensure that the tribal agencies were
virtually sovereign within, but insulated from much of the outside world.
The combination of Pakhtunwali (tradition)
and Shariah (Islamic laws) that prevailed was documented by serious anthropologists
in research studies and civil servants in imperial gazetteers and often alarmed
liberals. But until recently, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)
were a no-go zone, a Wild West. Until the implosion in these areas, few even
in India's strategic elite knew of the complexities of the FATA.
Gul's masterly account is important not just
for sketching in fine detail the manner in which Al Qaeda found a fertile
ground in many of these areas, but also for profiling each one of the seven
agencies of FATA and six pockets known as the Frontier Regions. The agencies
are, of course, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber, Kurram, Bajour,
Mohmand and Orakzai. And the regions are Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Tank
and Dera Ismail Khan. So for all those instant Pakistan experts, here is a
chance to read Gul's book and become a real expert.
Gul documents, with painstaking detail, how
many of these areas fell victim to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban after the
latter were forced out of Afghanistan. A combination of big money, the seductive
power of radical Islam and the de facto patronage of elements of Pakistan's
establishment created the conditions for Al Qaedism to find roots in FATA.
But there are three other parts of Gul's extraordinary
study which demand attention. First is the growing nexus between most militant
groups operating in Pakistan and Kashmir with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda.
It is the tribal areas which serve as a perfect sanctuary. For instance, after
Lashkar-e-Taiba came under pressure in Punjab, they moved a number of their
camps to Waziristan and Mohmand agencies, "where they lived close to
the compounds of the Arab Al Qaeda, whose ideological leanings - the Sunni
Wahabist version of Islam - they shared."
Gul's book also examines the continued linkages
between the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and many of these groups, including
the Taliban.
As is well known, during the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan, the ISI used American and Saudi money to train and motivate
many of these groups. But even after 9/11, the relationship is far from over.
The ISI, many believe, is convinced that the West will abandon Afghanistan
in a few years, and then these "strategic assets" will need to be
reactivated.
For instance, as Gul states: "after their
retreat from Afghanistan, the majority of foreigners had settled down in the
North and South Waziristan and Bajaur region, where networks operated by Afghan
war veterans Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbudin Hekmetyar became instrumental
in securing shelter for bin Laden's surviving fighters. Haqqani and Hekmetyar
also acted as the umbrella group for the reorganisation of the Al Qaeda."
Both Hekmatayar and Haqqani are still considered to be ISI's important assets
with the latter blamed for the bombing of the Indian embassy in Afghanistan.
Finally, Gul documents, somewhat sketchily,
the game being played by other powers, including by the Americans, the Saudis
and the Indians.
But what is the way out? Can Afghanistan be
stabilised as a precursor to stabilising the tribal areas? King Nadir Shah
of Afghanistan said in 1931: "In my opinion, the best and most fruitful
policy that one can imagine for Afghanistan is a policy of neutrality. Afghanistan
must always entertain good relations with its neighbours as well as all the
friendly powers that are not opposed to the national interest of the country.
Afghanistan must give its neighbours assurances of its friendly attitudes
while safeguarding the right of reciprocity. Such a line of conduct is the
best one for the interests of Afghanistan." In other words, the only
way out is for Afghanistan's neighbours and the great powers to guarantee
its neutrality.
As Karl Inderfurth wrote a few months ago:
"Such a package would give all the participants something of value. Pakistan
would secure Afghan recognition of its border and assurances that India would
not be allowed to use Afghan territory to pressure or destabilise Pakistan's
volatile border regions. India would be free to pursue normal relations with
Kabul, including direct trade and commercial ties. Iran would receive assurances
that the international community recognises its legitimate interests in Afghanistan
and that the US military presence on its eastern border is not permanent.
The United States and its allies would be able to depart, leaving behind a
society at peace with itself and its neighbours."
But until that happens, Imtiaz Gul's frightening
and fascinating book, which blends reportage with genuine scholarship, is
essential reading for all those who care for the region.
