Author: B.Raman
Publication: Ramanstrategicanalysis.Blogspot.com
Date: January 10, 2010
URL: http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/01/india-us-haunting-past-beckoning-future.html
(Written at the request of an Italian journal,
which is bringing out a special issue on the US later this month)
The US will continue to be a pre-eminent power
of the world. Despite its growing economic and military strength, China will
not be able to challenge the pre-eminence of the US. The pre-eminence of a
nation is not derived only from its GDP growth rate, foreign trade and military
modernization. It is also derived from its intellectual, technological, moral
and cultural strength and its ability to constantly innovate and evolve. China
is nowhere near the US in respect of these factors. It is unlikely to be in
the short and medium terms.
2. The biggest asset of the US is not its
armed forces. It is its educational system---its schools, colleges and universities
of excellence. It is its democratic system, its multi-cultural ambiance and
its ability to harmonise and profit from cultural influences from different
parts of the world. China is yet to build for itself a comparable educational
system. Its one-party State is not conducive to a robust intellectual debate
without which the intellectual prowess of a State and civil society will remain
stunted.
3. Stalin and his successors built up the
USSR into what they thought was the equal of the US as a super power. Large
parts of the world looked upon the USSR as the equal of the US. Nikita Khrushchev
even talked of the USSR overtaking the US and "burying the US capitalist
system." Look at what happened to the USSR and who was buried. The US
had the last laugh.
4. India is the only country in Asia, which
can evolve into a power comparable to the USA. Its democratic and educational
systems, its pluralistic civil society and its pervasive cultural influence
are strong foundations for its emergence as a power to be reckoned with not
only economically and militarily, but also intellectually and culturally.
India's growing hard power as measured by its economic and military strength
still lags behind that of China, but its soft power from which arises the
ability to influence the hearts and minds of people is far ahead of that of
China.
5. China is a distrusted power. Even its perceived
allies do not feel quite comfortable in its embrace. There is hardly any distrust
of India across the world--- except in Pakistan.
6. Whether one likes it or not, the US influence
will continue to count in the years to come. Its economy will recover faster
than one imagines. Its military strength and stamina will remain intact whatever
be the outcome of its "war" against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in
the Af-Pak region. There can be no meaningful challenge to its political influence.
The stamp of its political influence will be found in all major developments
of the world, whatever be the region. To talk of a world without US influence
or even with a reduced US influence will be illusory.
7. India has two options---- either continue
to be inhibited in its policies towards the US because of the negative experiences
of the past or get out of the stranglehold of these negative memories and
work for a new relationship with the US, which will be mutually beneficial.
The negative experiences and memories are still strong and many. One can mention
as examples the US attempt to initimidate India during the Indo-Pakistan war
of 1971, its building-up the military strength of Pakistan, its closing its
eyes to Pakistan's misuse of this military strength given for fighting communism
for fighting India and to Pakistan's use of terrorism as a weapon against
India, its encouragement of the Pakistani machinations on Kashmir , its refusal
to sell modern technologies to India, its placing India for nearly three decades
in a nuclear dog house after the Indian nuclear test of 1974 etc etc .
8. An attempt to get out of these negative
experiences was made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Barack
Obama's predecessor George Bush. The credit for visualizing India's potential
as an emerging power of Asia capable of considerable benign influence across
Asia should go to Bush and his Secretary of State Condolleezza Rice. They
were impressed by the strength of India's pluralism which had kept Al Qaeda
out of its Muslim community, the second largest in the world after that of
Indonesia. They were equally impressed by the strength of India's democracy
and its soft power. They wanted India to emerge as a pole of attraction for
the rest of Asia to counter the influence of China.
9. The foundations for a new strategic relationship
between India and the US were laid even during the presidency of Bill Clinton.
During his visit to India in 2000, Clinton and Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then
Indian Prime Minister, agreed on a new vision document to govern bilateral
relations. The first six years of the Clinton Presidency (1993 to 1999) were
wasted years so far as Indo-US relations were concerned. India's nuclear tests
of May 1998, and the strong US reactions to them and its joining hands with
China during Clinton's visit to China shortly after the tests in opposing
India's legitimate nuclear aspirations added to India's negative vibrations
towards the US. The Clinton Administration's support to India during India's
Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999 saw a turning point in the US policy-formulation
towards India. Clinton's successful visit to India in 2000 gave a further
momentum to the attempted move of the relations in a positive direction, but
in the few months left before he completed his term of office, Clinton could
not give concrete shape to the new vision.
10. The first four years of the Bush Presidency
too were wasted years in Indo-US relations. The preoccupation of the Bush
Administration with the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Af-Pak
region and with the war in Iraq and its dependence on the regime of Gen.Pervez
Musharraf in Pakistan came in the way of any vigorous thinking on the US relations
towards India. The first signs of a new thinking in Washington DC on the importance
of encouraging and helping India to take up its place as a pre-eminent power
of Asia, on par with China, came during the visit of Rice to India in March
2005 and the subsequent visit of Manmohan Singh to the US in July 2005.
11. The Indo-US agreement on civilian nuclear
co-operation signed during Manmohan Singh's visit to the US in July 2005 marked
the beginning of the process of discarding the past and moving to the future
which was beckoning the two countries. India was taken out of the nuclear
dog house. The promises made by the Clinton Administration to transfer dual-use
technologies to India on a case-by-case basis, which had remained unfulfilled,
were taken up once again with greater seriousness of purpose. Indian policy-makers
were in a mood to consider weapon purchases from the US, ridding themselves
of past fears that the US would be an undependable supplier of spare parts
which could be stopped for political reasons. Fears of US undependability
remained strong, but there was a realization that these fears should not be
allowed to come in the way for considering new options for the future. For
the first time in two decades, an attempt was made by the Bush Administration
in its second term to reduce the trust deficit between India and the US and
increase the mutual comfort level.
12. The one year of Barack Obama as the President
has unfortunately not been a totally positive experience for India. There
were hopes and dupes. What was seen as the Obama Administration's courting
of China resulted in a diminution of the importance of India as a counter
to China. US economic difficulties partly accounted for this courting. There
were other reasons too. The Obama Administration did not see China as a likely
threat to the US influences in Asia in the same manner as the Bush Administration
did. There was a feeling that the US and China could live and let live in
Asia without stepping on each other's toes.
13. The unmistakable anxiety of the Obama
Administration to be attentive to China's concerns and sensitivities resulted
in the discarding of the Bush Administration's ideas such as a democracy quadrilateral
involving the US, India, Japan and Australia and the five-power naval exercises
in the waters of South-East Asia involving the Navies of the US, India, Singapore,
Japan and Australia.
14. India was no longer seen as a power, which
should be encouraged and helped to reach an equality of status with China.
The tacit US decision to recognize China's pre-eminence in Asia was evident
in the decision of Obama to legitimize a Chinese role as a benign influence
in South Asia during his visit to China in November, 2009. This action of
the Obama Administration, more than anything else, surprised India and was
strongly criticized by many Indian analysts.
15. The failure of Manmohan Singh's talks
with Obama during his State visit to Washington later in November, 2009, to
give a push forward to the implementation of the civilian nuclear deal added
to India's disappointments. The delay in the implementation has been attributed
to the Obama Administration's reluctance to transfer to India uranium enrichment
and reprocessing technologies. Despite the flurry of spins by the advisers
of Manmohan Singh it is obvious that the no-changers in the US in respect
of nuclear co-operation, who are believed in India to be close to Obama, are
once again influencing policy and Obama is disinclined to overrule them.
16. On Pakistan too, the past is back to haunt
India. India's hopes that Obama will take a strong line towards Pakistan and
will stop the past pampering of Pakistan by different Administrations have
been belied. India has been noting with unease the repeated comments from
Obama and others about the need for a regional approach----whether in relation
to the restoration of normalcy in Afghanistan or the fight against jihadi
terrorism emanating from the Pakistani territory.
17. Pakistani analysts such as Ahmed Rashid
have been able to sell the idea to the advisers of Obama that a regional approach
would have to address the concerns of the Pakistani military-intelligence
establishment over what they view as the increasing Indian presence in Afghanistan.
This presence is viewed by the military-intelligence establishment as detrimental
to Pakistan's historic interests in Afghanistan and its internal security,
particularly in Balochistan. Till 2004, the Bush Administration was attentive
to Pakistani concerns and sought to discourage an increase in the Indian presence
in Afghanistan. Its policy changed thereafter due to the belief that greater
interactions between India and Afghanistan could contribute to the strengthening
of democracy and governance in Afghanistan.
18. Similarly, analysts such as Ahmed Rashid
have been trying to convince Obama and his advisers that without a more active
role by the US in facilitating a search for a solution to the Kashmir issue,
there will be no incentive for Pakistan to act sincerely and effectively against
the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. The Bush Administration
was disinclined to follow an activist policy on Kashmir and accepted India's
stand that it was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan in which others
should have no role. Obama and his advisers seem prepared to revisit this
policy, if not immediately, at least at a later date.
19. The revived drag of the past has fortunately
not reversed the move towards the future. The credit for this should largely
go to Manmohan Singh, who seems convinced more than any other Indian leader
that periodic disappointments and misperceptions, which are inevitable in
the relations between the two biggest democracies and pluralist societies
of the world, should not be allowed to damage their joint vision for the future.
They should keep moving forward despite such disappointments and misperceptions.
That is what India has been doing.
20. All major political formations in India
barring the communists and large sections of its people want closer relations
with the US and the forward momentum to be maintained. The large community
of Indian origin in the US, which has been in the forefront of the intellectual
and managerial class of the US, are an important driving force in this regard.
So too, their relatives in India. Young Indians continue to look upon the
US with fascination. They have no memories of the past. They have no time
and patience for the political and politicized arguments of the no-changers
in India. They welcomed the changes brought about by Manmohan Singh in our
perceptions of the US and want these changes to continue.
21. The forward movement, therefore, continues----with
varying velocity. And it will continue. But disappointments will continue
to take place too. Such disappointments will be as much due to India as they
would be due to the US. No thinking has ever been done in India as to what
it expects out of a long-term strategic relationship with the US. It is often
the US which decides what it will give to India and it is New Delhi which
accepts. India's expectations from the US in the past were limited to US pressure
on Pakistan to stop using terrorism against India, removal of restrictions
on the supply of modern dual-use technologies to India and US support for
India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council. They remain the same.
Any strategic relationship has to be a quid pro quo relationship. Since the
US has hardly any dependence on India in any matter, there is no scope for
any quid pro quo.
22. India visualises itself as an Asian power
on par with China. Beijing does not see it this way. China views India as
a sub-regional Asian power and wants to keep its influence restricted to its
immediate neighbourhood. Obama's visit to China has uncomfortably brought
out to India that there is a convergence of perceptions between China and
the Obama Administration on the limited regional role of India. China's pre-eminence
has been recognised by Obama. He has re-hyphenated India-Pakistan relations
and quietly relegated India to the role of a sub-regional power whose aspirations
of having a status on par with China are unrealistic.
23. In geopolitical matters, there is no futuristic
thinking in India. The quality of Indian thinking and analysis----strategic
and tactical----is poor. What passes for analysis in India is often wishful-thinking.
Nobody in India has realised and brought out that for the first time the US,
Japan and Australia have a leadership which does not rate highly India's potential
as an emerging power. There is less and less talk of Chindia.
24. Someone once said that power and influence
are not given. They are taken. China has shown how to take it. India does
not have the political will and courage to fight for it and take it. It is
hoping that the US will give it. Bush and Condolleezza Rice seemed inclined
to bestow on India the status of an Asian power on par with China. The Obama
Administration does not seem to be so inclined.
25. Policy changes in India are rarely preceded
by a debate in depth on the implications of the contemplated changes. The
change of policy towards the US was brought about by Manmohan Singh without
a national debate in public or in the Parliament on the wisdom of the change.
Whatever debate was there in the Parliament with reference to the nuclear
deal tended to be more an exchange of rhetoric than an analysis of facts and
figures. There is hardly any effort to bring about a national consensus on
foreign policy. When changes are driven by a determined individual and not
by a national debate and consensus, there is a danger of the policy being
jettisoned if the disappointments continue.
26. Can that happen to the Indo-US strategic
relationship? Unlikely. The large public and particularly youth support for
a forward-moving Indo-US relationship is a guarantee that the forward movement
will continue. (10-1-10)
- (The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai
Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
