Author: Dan Blumenthal
Publication: The Wall Street Journal
Date: March 1, 2010
URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704240004575085023077072074.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines#articleTabs%3Darticle
This isn't just a change in military doctrine-it's
a reflection of America's declining power in Asia.
There is one country responding to China's
military build-up and aggressiveness with some muscle of its own. No, it is
not the United States, the superpower ostensibly responsible for maintaining
peace and security in Asia. Rather, it is India, whose military is currently
refining a "two-front war" doctrine to fend off Pakistan and China
simultaneously.
Defending against Pakistan isn't anything
new, and Delhi has long viewed China with suspicion. But in recent years India
has been forced to think more seriously about an actual armed conflict with
its northern neighbor. Last year Beijing started a rhetorical clash over the
Dalai Lama's and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visits to Arunachal
Pradesh state, which China claims as its own. In the two years before that,
Chinese border incursions into India almost doubled. Not to mention China's
massive military buildup and concerted push for a blue-water navy.
In response, the Indian military is rewriting
its so-called "Cold Start" doctrine. Cold Start's initial intent
was to provide the armed forces with more rapid and flexible response options
to Pakistani aggression. The Indian military believed that its ground forces'
slow and lumbering mobilization after the 2001 terrorist attacks on its parliament
played to Pakistan's advantage: International opinion turned against decisive
Indian military action. Delhi also worried that its plan to send in heavy
forces to weaken Pakistan was unrealistic and might well trigger a nuclear
response.
So Indian strategists searched for military
solutions that would avoid a nuclear response but still provide a rapid retaliatory
punch into Pakistan. The resulting doctrine was built around eight division-sized
"integrated battle groups"-a combination of mobile ground forces
backed by air power and tied together through an advanced system of sensors
and reconnaissance capabilities. The Indian Army would advance into Pakistan
and hold territory to use as leverage to end terrorist attacks launched from
Pakistani soil.
But as China has grown more aggressive, Delhi
has begun planning to fight a "two-front war" in case China and
Pakistan ally against India. Army Chief of Staff General Deepak Kapoor recently
outlined the strategy: Both "fronts"-the northeastern one with China
and northwestern one with Pakistan-would receive equal attention. If attacked
by Pakistan and China, India will use its new integrated battle groups to
deal quick decisive blows against both simultaneously.
The two-front strategy's ambitions go even
further: In the long term China is the real focus for Indian strategists.
According to local newspapers, Gen. Kapoor told a defense seminar late last
year that India's forces will "have to substantially enhance their strategic
reach and out-of-area capabilities to protect India's geopolitical interests
stretching from the [Persian] Gulf to Malacca Strait" and "to protect
our island territories" and assist "the littoral states in the Indian
Ocean Region."
Of course the existence of a new doctrine
does not make it an operational reality. But a cursory glance at India's acquisition
patterns and strategic moves gives every indication that India is well on
its way to implementation. Delhi is buying and deploying sophisticated command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
networks; supersonic cruise missiles; lightweight towed artillery pieces;
and new fighter aircraft with supporting electronic warfare and refueling
platforms. India has already bought C-130J aircraft from the U.S. for rapid
force deployment. The navy is planning to expand its submarine fleet, to acquire
three aircraft carriers, and to deploy them with modernized carrier-based
fighter aircraft. In addition India plans to deploy fighters and unmanned
aerial vehicles at upgraded bases on the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the
eastern Indian Ocean.
India is not looking for a fight with China:
It simply understands it is prudent to develop a military that can deter Beijing.
President Obama's accommodating stance toward China and his apparent lack
of interest in cementing partnership with Delhi have focused Indian minds,
as have his failure to invest in resources his Pacific commanders need.
While America has a strong interest in sharing
the burdens of checking China's expansionism, it should be concerned when
its friends react in part to a perception of American weakness and Chinese
strength. Ultimately, the U.S. is the only country with the power and resources
to reassure its allies they need not engage in costly arms races with China.
But first the U.S. must identify Chinese military power for what Asian allies
know it to be: a threat to peace in Asia.
- Mr. Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute in Washington.
