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Outsourcing jihad

Outsourcing jihad

Author: Shashi Shekhar
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: March 8, 2010
URL: http://www.dailypioneer.com/240502/Outsourcing-jihad.html

It is clear that David Coleman Headley and his associate Tahawwur Rana represent a new breed of jihadi freelancers willing to offer their services to multiple sponsors of Islamist terror, while Lashkar-e-Tayyeba is playing the role of a 'global jihad facilitator'

Terror struck India once again on February 26, this time in Kabul with the targeting of Indian citizens and Indian interests. The Kabul attack came as India not just resumed talks with Pakistan but also looked to Saudi Arabia to exert pressure on it to act on terror. While the jury is out on the likely effectiveness of this diplomatic option, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa'h's Hafiz Saeed made no bones of the patronage his group receives from Saudi Arabia. Hafiz Saeed openly exhorted jihad in fresh speeches made days before the resumption of talks with Pakistan apart from giving a lengthy interview to a Pakistan-based media outlet. The ease with which Hafiz Saeed and his outfit continue to operate in Pakistan is yet another pointer to an emerging narrative of state-sponsored terror in Pakistan that goes far beyond the contours of the 'Karachi Project'.

In an upcoming book titled Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Mr Stephen Tankel, who is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, describes how the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has evolved since 2001 and more specifically 2006. Speaking at a seminar organised by the New America Foundation recently, Mr Tankel outlined the magnitude of the threat posed by Lashkar. He reiterated that the Lashkar's primary focus continues to be India while describing an evolution of in its strategy of blending attacks to simultaneously target Indian and Western interests. But the more significant insight from Mr Tankel comes from what he describes as the Lashkar's ideal suitability for playing the role of a 'global jihadist facilitator'.

If one were to draw a Silicon Valley analogy, Mr Tankel's picture of the Lashkar is that of 'jihadi venture capitalist and incubator'. With its robust finances, he says, the Lashkar is able to sponsor attacks either by the group itself or by nodes within its network in collaboration with other groups. What makes the Lashkar unique is its ability to go beyond the financing by providing additional logistical support to facilitate attacks. One way the Lashkar is able to provide such logistical support is by offering its training facilities to other groups, exploiting the relatively less stringent scrutiny its training camps receive.

According to Mr Tankel, support from Lashkar to other groups is evident from Jalozai Refugee Camp in Peshawar where allegedly training was provided to Al Qaeda suicide bombers headed for Afghanistan. Mr Tankel also draws attention to two other attacks in Afghanistan in 2008 directed against a United States combat outpost in Wanat and the Indian Embassy in Kabul where Lashkar is said to have collaborated with other groups. Mr Tankel's narrative of Lashkar's collaboration with other groups takes a curious turn when he talks of jihadi freelancing.

As observed by this columnist in the past on the 'Karachi Project' as well as from the body of evidence made public in the Chicago conspiracy case it is clear that David Headley and his associated Tahawwur Rana represented a new breed of jihadi free agents willing to offer their services to multiple sponsors of jihadi terror. According to Mr Tankel, the freelancing started at the mid-level and lower levels around 2006 with logistical and manpower support to anti-establishment groups within Pakistan like the TTP. Mr Tankel says this support has been in the areas of movement of people and material, safe houses, surveillance, false identities amongst other things.

Mr Tankel also highlights how the Lashkar continues expand its operations in the NWFP/FATA regions of Pakistan despite the official ban. According to him, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa'h operates a large number of mosques and Madaris in NWFP. Specific interest to India ought to be Liasion and Recruitment offices in Lower Dir and Swat districts, as well as a base camp near Darra Adam Khel.

Mr Tankel also throws light on the trust deficit between the TTP, Al Qaeda and the Lashkar on account of its proximity to the ISI with specific instances of inter-jihadi rivalry. But he feels these fault lines were getting reconciled starting 2006 with the advent of freelancing and collaboration as has been evident from the Chicago conspiracy case which saw freelancers like David Headley collaborating simultaneously with the Lashkar and with the Ilyas Kashmiri lead 313 Brigade.

Still much remains unknown of the freelancing terror syndicate that the Lashkar-ISI complex has evolved into.

Mr Tankel sheds no light on how high up the freelancing and collaboration runs nor does he shed light on the degree to which the ISI and serving or retired Pakistani military officers are complicit. Neither does he shed light on who controls the "robust finances" of this terror syndicate and how they are managed. Lastly, we continue to remain in the dark on the command and control structure of this Lashkar-ISI Terror Syndicate beyond the jihadi demagogues and Islamist charity front outfits.

While Mr Tankel's primary focus was on the threat to the West from Lashkar's connections and collaboration, it is clear from his analysis that the direct and primary threat from Lashkar is to India. The jihadi freelancing and opportunistic collaboration described him makes it clear that India is no longer dealing with monolithic jihadi outfits with firm loyalties to either the state or to a cause. It would be myopic of India to narrowly focus its energies on a diplomatic process punctuated by periodic exchange of dossiers. What we now have in Pakistan instead, is a terror syndicate of freelancing state and non-state actors with commercial interests in the business of jihad. These interests go far beyond the AfPak theatre and will likely outlast American presence in this theatre. Its time our strategic calculus factored this chilling reality.

- The writer, an expert on security affairs, tracks terrorism in South Asia.



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