Author: Barry Rubin
Publication: Gloria-Center.org
Date: July 1, 2010
URL: http://www.gloria-center.org/gloria/2010/07/cia-chief-says-al-qaida-weaker
CIA chief Leon Panetta says al-Qaida is at
its weakest point since before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. He's probably right, though the amount of decline in the last three
years or so has probably not been large.
Most of the damage to al-Qaida was done during
the preceding administration and that's a statement of fact not of political
viewpoint. After all, depriving al-Qaida of its base in Afghanistan and Taliban
ally-the most important actions damaging the group-took place a decade ago.
And with a few lucky breaks, for example if passengers on that Detroit-bound
plane had been less alert, al-Qaida might well have new massacres to brag
about.
But the most important question is not who
should get credit for weakening al-Qaida-a terrorist group, by the way, that
could make Panetta's optimistic statement look foolishly premature by a single
major successful attack on any day of the week-but how one should regard that
organization.
In terms of launching terrorist attacks on
the territory of the United States or on U.S. installations abroad, al-Qaida
certainly has been the number-one threat. The group's decline is certainly
a good thing and both administrations deserve credit for fighting that battle.
But focusing on al-Qaida, now listed as the
sole enemy of the United States in what used to be called the war on terrorism
but is now called something or other--leaves out two things of great importance
which often seem to be missing in the Obama Administration's policy.
First, the longer-term historical importance
of al-Qaida has not been to be the revolutionary impetus in its own name but
the inspiration for a great increase in revolutionary Islamist activity in
many places. An increase in anti-American terrorism was a key element in this
process but is only one part of the picture. Al-Qaida's role has been particularly
important in Iraq, Yemen, and to a lesser extent in North Africa.
Left out of the celebration regarding victories
over the organization has also been the fact that a lot of the terrorist activity
has passed to individuals or small groups in the West and Middle East that
act on the basis of ideology, or sometimes of some training and encouragement,
rather than as the direct arm of al-Qaida.
Consider, for example, the Fort Hood attack
or failed attacks in a number of places, including one planned for Fort Dix.
Individual Muslims or small affinity groups are active. One cannot, of course,
achieve a victory over spontaneous decisions of Muslims to become Jihadists,
perhaps after reading al-Qaida or other propaganda.
U.S. policy has not so much fought this phenomenon
but rather largely pretends that it doesn't exist. An attack like that at
the El Al ticket counter in Los Angeles Airport, or killing a U.S. army recruiter
in Arkansas, or attacking a Jewish community center in the Pacific Northwest
is merely reinterpreted as the act of an individual deranged mind.
The second, and more important, problem with
Panetta's triumphalism is that al-Qaida never posed much of a strategic threat
to the United States. Of course, it could stage bloody terror attacks but
it could not take over countries.
The real threat, then, is the Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas-Iraqi
insurgent alliance plus movements like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and
others.
Here, too, the administration has played a
strategy of ignoring the problem. It seems to believe that by diplomatic engagement,
or expressions of sympathy, or benign neglect, or moving away from Israel,
or insisting that these movements have nothing to do with Islam, the problem
can be defused.
But while revolutionary Islamism was set back-at
least temporarily-in Iraq it continues to advance elsewhere. Moreover, the
movement is further strengthened by the prospect of Iran as a nuclear power
and by a U.S. policy that constrains Israel, accepts a Hamas regime in Gaza,
does nothing to obstruct Hizballah's power in Lebanon, is reluctant to pressure
Iran, engages rather than weakens Syria, and many more steps like these.
Al-Qaida can blow up a building. But the revolutionary
Islamists can blow up a country. And soon Iran will be able to blow up the
entire Middle East.
- Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research
in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review
of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.
