Author: Dan Blumenthal
Publication: The wall Street Journal
Date: May 24, 2011
URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576344971111459988.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
Most countries celebrated this month's slaying
of Osama bin Laden as an unadulterated good, but two of them are reacting
with ambivalence. China and Pakistan have found the death of the al Qaeda
leader an opportune time to solidify a relationship that has a distinct anti-American
odor. Pakistan wants to play the "China card." And China wants to
further its narrow national interests, no matter the broader consequences.
Islamabad's reaction to bin Laden's death
is understandable if unjustifiable. U.S. special forces felled the terrorist
on Pakistani soil without Pakistani foreknowledge. Pakistani leaders felt
compelled to appeal to nationalist sentiment by decrying the violation of
sovereignty-even if by harboring terrorists Pakistan has lost its right to
sovereignty.
It also has reason to fear its standing in
Washington. Questions linger about Pakistani knowledge of or support for bin
Laden's long stay in Abbottabad. Naturally, there is a steady drumbeat in
Washington to reexamine the entire relationship with Pakistan, including the
generous provision of aid.
From a Pakistani perspective, it then makes
sense to ease the pressure from Washington by embracing China. With a "China
card," Islamabad is assured an ally who can stand up for it in international
circles as well as provide capital. Visiting Beijing last week, Prime Minister
Yousuf Gilani praised China as "an all weather friend"-in stark
contrast to you-know-who. President Asif Zardari declared that the Pakistan-Sino
relationship was unmatched "by any other relationship between two sovereign
countries."
Mr. Gilani also secured the delivery of 50
JF-17 multirole fighter jets. Receiving aircraft from China-already Pakistan's
largest supplier of weaponry by far-must have been all the more satisfying
coming a month after its arch rival India turned down two U.S. fighter bids.
It sent a message that Islamabad's relations with Beijing are more stable
than New Delhi's with
Beijing offers its ally more support than
just fighters. While China announced it was happy that bin Laden was dead,
it quickly followed with expressions of sympathy for Pakistan and praise for
its less-than-stellar record of fighting terrorism. China's foreign ministry
explained that China "will continue to support Pakistan formulating…counter-terrorism
strategies based on its own national conditions…." From this point
of view, the U.S was supposed to respect Pakistan's "national conditions"
while going after the world's most wanted man.
Finally, Pakistan and China agreed that Beijing
will operate the strategically positioned port in Gwadar, Pakistan. The port
has raised concerns in New Delhi and Washington for the ability it gives the
Chinese navy to operate in the Indian Ocean.
These Sino-Pakistani transactions are an intensification
of a blossoming relationship. Just last year, China circumvented its obligations
as a member of the Nuclear Supplier's Group to sell two new nuclear reactors
to Pakistan with no strings attached. An unstable Pakistan with a burgeoning
nuclear arsenal is the stuff of nightmare security scenarios for the rest
of the world, and yet Beijing decided to sell it more nuclear material.
Pakistan's interests are clear here. But what
explains China's disturbing diplomacy?
China's Pakistan policy has three objectives.
First, Beijing sees Islamabad as a way to distract India from its great-power
aspirations. An India concerned about a Pakistan threat is an India that cannot
compete with China. Second, China wants to get into the great-power maritime
game by operating ports throughout the Indian Ocean. Chinese projection of
maritime power in the Indian Ocean can pose a threat to Indian and American
naval mastery. Third, China wants help from Pakistan in keeping Islamic radicals
from entering its Western province of Xinjiang.
From a charitable point of view, China is
simply advancing its narrow national interests. But China's very concept of
its national interest is the problem at hand.
China's pursuit of narrow interests, consequences
be damned, is the equivalent of taking a wrecking ball to the current international
order. It has pursued its interests before with Iran and North Korea, and
the results of that are evident. The only reason China can afford to behave
irresponsibly in these cases is because American arms and diplomacy are there
to save the day.
Indeed, the international order the United
States promotes and maintains-however imperfectly at times-benefits all those
who want to join it. It produces public goods like the freedom of navigation
in the seas, keeps the peace between great powers and leads in the fight against
nuclear proliferation and terrorism that threaten the whole world-including
pressuring countries that harbor terrorists, even if it sometimes violates
their sovereignty. Washington cannot accomplish these strategic tasks if Beijing
actively thwarts it.
China's Pakistan diplomacy offers a glimpse
of one possible future in international politics. Beijing is clearly building
up its power to challenge Washington's dominance and frustrate its goals,
but it doesn't provide a responsible alternative to U.S. primacy. Should China
succeed in undermining American aims, the world will not face a choice between
Chinese or American leadership. Rather, Chinese behavior is leading to a choice
between order and chaos.
Mr. Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
