Author: Syed Ata Hasnain
Publication: Swarajyamag.com
Date: August 28, 2015
URL: http://swarajyamag.com/politics/the-indo-pak-conflict-1965-know-the-broad-contours/
As the Golden Jubilee of the conflict with Pakistan in 1965 commences from 28 Aug 2015, Swarajya brings its readers various commentaries on the 1965 War, beginning with the backdrop to the Conflict explained in this piece by Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
The reason why 28 Aug 2015 is taken as the start point of the 50th anniversary of the Indo Pak Conflict 1965 is that on this day the Indian Army achieved its outstanding victory at Haji Pir. It did take a few more days to consolidate the hold and link up with additional forces from the south but Haji Pir from this day became the symbol of Indian domination through the 1965 Conflict.
Dubious claims of Pakistan through its celebrations on 6 September each year has created a perception that India and the Indian Army were soundly defeated in this war. The only reason why India’s undoubted victory in 1965 is not celebrated as profoundly is because there are far greater and more decisive victories to celebrate – 1971 and 1999 for instance.
Yet, public perception about this war needs to be clear. Why did Pakistan launch the war, what did it hope to gain, how did the war progress, what were the results and what lessons can be learnt for the current and future environment? That is how a military analysis of wars usually takes place and that is exactly how this and subsequent essays will explain the Indo Pak Conflict of 1965 to the public.
The starting point is the War of 1947-48 over J&K initiated by Pakistan using irregulars (tribals). India’s timely action of launching the Indian Army into Srinagar airfield on 27 Oct 1947 saved J&K. The war ended with a ceasefire and India holding the bulk of the territory of J&K. Pakistan remained obsessed with the loss. Through the Fifties and early Sixties it sought to strengthen itself militarily and economically by joining the US led anti-Communist pacts – SEATO and CENTO thus securing a special relationship with the US.
This also fetched it modern military hardware such as Patton tanks and F-86 Sabre jets. With a military leadership at the helm after the 1958 takeover by Fd Marshal Ayub Khan it assumed that it had the ability to militarily defeat India The latter followed a more benign and accommodating approach commencing from the initiative to take the J&K issue to the UN right through to the very conciliatory Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.
The Indian military had little or no role to play in strategic advice and its position in the national hierarchy itself was a diluted one. This gave the perception that India’s Armed Forces were weak, unprepared for war and would have no role in decision making severely restricting India’s military responses to provocations. The perception was roundly substantiated in late 1962 when an escalating crisis was poorly handled, military advice ignored and a grossly unprepared army was launched into a border war with China in which it was defeated. From 1962 to 1965 a few events are of importance for our analysis.
* Pakistan perceived that China as its enemy’s enemy was a friend. To firm up the relationship it illegally gave away 5000 square km of territory in Shaqsgam Valley of Gilgit Baltistan to China. It hoped that China would keep India’s potential reserves committed to the east.
* The Indian Army went into overdrive to expand its strength and absorb better hardware. Pakistan was wary of this and knew that given a few more years the Indian Army’s capability would be vastly improved.
Nehru died in May 1964, leaving an apparent leadership void. Pakistan perceived PM Shastri as a weak leader (he was to prove otherwise) incapable of strategic decisions to expand a conflict beyond J&K to a full blown war.
* While the US had supported India in the Sino Indian border war of 1962 Pakistan was confident of its support against India. The Soviet Union was not passionate about its relationship with India but both superpowers were clear that another Indian military defeat in such a short time would spell disaster for India’s future as a nation.
It was Ayub’s Foreign Minister (FM), the ambitious Zulfiqar Bhutto who instigated him with a series of reasons as to why there could not be a more opportune moment to wrest J&K by a military action preceded by a triggered and sponsored people’s uprising. Not the least of the reasons was a self-delusional belief that the Indian jawan could not compare with the fighting prowess of the Pakistan Army’s robust Punjabi, Baluch, Pathan content.
What is surprising is that Ayub fell for it even though he had served with the British Indian Army for 19 years before he became part of the Pakistan Army. He knew the Dogra, Sikh, Rajput and other glorious regiments of the Indian Army. Yet, time was running out and he had to embed himself in Pakistan’s history as its greatest leader.
He therefore accepted his FM’s advice even though it is well known that his prudent and more professional Army Chief, Gen Musa was completely against it. Musa felt that India could not restrict the war to J&K if it was at a disadvantage at any stage. Musa’s prediction proved how right thinking military minds can predict events well ahead.
Ayub did four things to prepare for the upcoming war which he had decided to launch and decisively win in J&K.
* Firstly, the Pakistan Army activated the CFL (ceasefire line) with shelling and small arms; part of this was in Pakistan’s favorite area for intervention, Kargil; and then too along the highway through the main town.
* Secondly, it commenced composing and training a guerrilla force comprising approximately 5000-8000 mix of regular soldiers and ethnic Kashmiris from PoK, under Maj Gen Akhtar Malik (an Ahmadiyya Muslim), GOC 12 Division, Murree. It was to be launched as Operation Gibraltar (Pakistan is obsessed with events and landmarks in Spain; even Zia’s supposed mission for J&K was titled Op Topac).
* Thirdly, he prepared a plan for a rapid thrust on Akhnoor once the Gibraltar forces would start succeeding. The aim being, to capture the famous iron girder bridge over River Chenab which was the lifeline for Rajouri sector.
* Fourth and final was his decision to test the waters in Kutch well away from J&K where he could catch the Indian Army by surprise. This operation commenced in April 1965, was never pressed through and a ceasefire was brokered by the intervention of the British PM only by 01 Jul 1965.
Operation Gibraltar was launched in early Aug 1965 all across the LoC which was then held relatively thinly by India’s 19 Infantry Div (my honor to have commanded it too) and 25 Infantry Div (south of Pir Panjal). These divisions could only hold defenses, not prevent infiltration. The infiltrators were discovered by Bakarwals in the higher reaches, as it usually is. Operations to contact and battle the infiltrators took the better part of three weeks and no Kashmiris ever joined the infiltrators; in fact they joined the Indian Army in its operations.
Ayub did four things to prepare for the upcoming war which he had decided to launch and decisively win in J&K.
Firstly, the Pakistan Army activated the CFL (ceasefire line) with shelling and small arms; part of this was in Pakistan’s favorite area for intervention, Kargil; and then too along the highway through the main town.
Secondly, it commenced composing and training a guerrilla force comprising approximately 5000-8000 mix of regular soldiers and ethnic Kashmiris from PoK, under Maj Gen Akhtar Malik (an Ahmadiyya Muslim), GOC 12 Division, Murree. It was to be launched as Operation Gibraltar (Pakistan is obsessed with events and landmarks in Spain; even Zia’s supposed mission for J&K was titled Op Topac).
Thirdly, he prepared a plan for a rapid thrust on Akhnoor once the Gibraltar forces would start succeeding. The aim being, to capture the famous iron girder bridge over River Chenab which was the lifeline for Rajouri sector.
Fourth and final was his decision to test the waters in Kutch well away from J&K where he could catch the Indian Army by surprise. This operation commenced in April 1965, was never pressed through and a ceasefire was brokered by the intervention of the British PM only by 01 Jul 1965.
Operation Gibraltar was launched in early Aug 1965 all across the LoC which was then held relatively thinly by India’s 19 Infantry Div (my honor to have commanded it too) and 25 Infantry Div (south of Pir Panjal). These divisions could only hold defenses, not prevent infiltration. The infiltrators were discovered by Bakarwals in the higher reaches, as it usually is. Operations to contact and battle the infiltrators took the better part of three weeks and no Kashmiris ever joined the infiltrators; in fact they joined the Indian Army in its operations.
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